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Demography and the Long-Run 
Predictability  of the Stock  AMarket 
THE SECULAR  MOVEMENT  OF the U.S. stock market in the postwar period 
has been characterized  by three distinct twenty-year episodes of sustained 
increases or decreases in real stock prices: the bull market of 1945-66,  the 
subsequent bear market of the 1970s and early 1980s, and the bull market 
of  the middle and late  1980s  and the  1990s.  Explanations of  the most 
recent and spectacular bull market have typically been based on several 
factors:' the advent of  a "new economy" in which innovations create a 
permanently  higher  rate  of  economic  growth  and  an  accompanying 
increase in the intangible capital of the corporate sector;2  the substantial 
increase in participation in the market; and the apparent decrease in risk 
aversion of the baby-boom generation.3 Similar arguments, based on the 
''new economy" created by the technical innovations of  the immediate 
This paper was begun during a visit at the Cowles  Foundation in the fall of 2000  and 
revised during a visit in the fall of 2002.  Michael Magill and Martine Quinzii are grateful 
for the stimulating environment and the research support provided by the Cowles Founda- 
tion. We are also grateful to Robert Shiller for helpful discussions and to participants at the 
Cowles  Conference  on  Incomplete  Markets at Yale  University,  the  SITE Workshop at 
Stanford University,  the Incomplete  Markets Workshop at the State University  of  New 
York, Stony Brook, during the summer of 2001, the Southwest Economic Conference at the 
University  of California, Los Angeles,  and the Conference for the Advancement of Eco- 
nomic Theory at Rhodes, Greece, in 2003  for helpful comments. The authors claim sole 
responsibility for the remaining weaknesses. 
1.  These  explanations,  although  couched  in  the  language  of  analytical  models,  are 
essentially  the same as those given by Irving Fisher (1929)  for the stock market boom of 
the 1920s. 
2.  McGrattan and Prescott (2000); Hall (2000). 
3.  Heaton and Lucas (2000). 
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postwar period and increased participation in the stock market, have also 
been used to justify the bull market of the 1950s.4 The period of declining 
stock prices from 1966 to  1982 has spawned fewer rationales, as docu- 
mented  by  the  well-known  paper by  Franco Modigliani  and Richard 
Cohn.s They argued that real earnings and interest rates could not account 
for the 50 percent decline in the real Standard and Poor's  (S&P) index 
between  1966 and 1978, and they found themselves  forced to conclude 
that the only explanation for the sustained decrease in stock prices was 
that investors, at least in the presence of unaccustomed and fluctuating 
inflation, are unable to free themselves from certain forms of money illu- 
sion and therefore look to the nominal rather than the real rate of interest 
when  valuing  equity.  Although  these  explanations  probably  capture 
important elements underlying the behavior of stock prices in each of the 
three episodes, they cannot readily be pieced together to form a coherent 
explanation of the stock market over the whole sixty-year period. 
The idea motivating this paper is that demography is a common thread 
that might provide a single explanation for the alternating bull and bear 
markets over the whole postwar period. Since the turn of the twentieth 
century, live births in the United States have also gone through alternating 
twenty-year periods of boom and bust: for example, the low birth rate dur- 
ing the Great Depression  and the war years was followed  by the baby 
boom of the 1950s and early 1960s and the baby bust of the 1970s. These 
birth waves have resulted in systematic changes in the age composition of 
the population over  the postwar period, roughly corresponding to  the 
twenty-year periods of boom and bust in the stock market. 
People have distinct financial needs at different periods of their life, 
typically borrowing when young, investing for retirement when middle- 
aged, and disinvesting during retirement. Stocks (along with other assets 
such  as real estate  and bonds)  are a vehicle  for the  savings  of  those 
preparing for their retirement. It seems  plausible  that a large middle- 
aged cohort seeking  to  save  for retirement will  push up the prices of 
these securities,  and that prices will  be depressed in periods when the 
middle-aged cohort is small. We find that this is indeed the case in the 
model we develop in this paper, regardless of whether economic  agents 
are myopic  or fully  aware of  demography and its implications.  James 
4.  See Malkiel (1990) and Shiller (2000). 
5.  Modigliani and Cohn (1979). John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  243 
Poterba has argued that, if agents were rational, they would  anticipate 
any demography-induced rise in stock prices twenty years before it hap- 
pened, bidding up prices at that time and thereby negating much of the 
effect of demographics on stock prices.6 We show that, in our model, if 
agents are myopic,  blindly  plowing  savings  into  stocks  when middle- 
aged,  stock prices  will  be proportional to the size  of  the middle-aged 
cohort. But we also show that, when agents fully anticipate demographic 
trends, their rational response  actually  reinforces  the  effect  on  stock 
prices, making prices rise more than proportionally to the growth of the 
middle-aged cohort. 
To test how much of the variation in security prices can be explained 
by  the  combination  of  life-cycle  behavior and changing  demographic 
structure, we  study the equilibria of  a cyclical,  stochastic, overlapping- 
generations exchange economy, calibrated to the stylized facts of agents' 
lifetime income patterns, the payoffs of securities, and the demographic 
structure  in the United States during the postwar period. We derive three 
predictions from our model, which we then compare with historical data 
on stock and bond returns. The first prediction is that price-earnings (PE) 
ratios should be proportional to the ratio of middle-aged to young adults 
(the MY ratio). The second is that real rates of return  on equity and bonds 
should be an increasing function of the change in the MY ratio. Lastly, we 
show in our model that the equity premium should covary with the YM 
ratio (the reciprocal of the MY ratio), even though the young are more 
risk-tolerant than the middle-aged. 
The fact that the most recent stock market boom coincided with the 
period  in  which  the  generation of  post-World  War II baby-boomers 
reached middle age has led Wall Street participants  and the financial press 
to attribute part of the rise in prices to the investment behavior of baby- 
boomers preparing for their retirement. Professional economists,  on the 
other hand, have been skeptical of the connection between demography 
and stock prices. Although Gurdip Bakshi and Zhiwu Chen documented a 
striking relationship between the average age of the U.S. population over 
twenty and the movement of the real S&P index since 1945,7 a systematic 
literature studying the relationship between  demography and prices of 
financial assets has emerged only recently. On the empirical side, Diane 
6.  Poterba (2001). 
7.  Bakshi and Chen (1994). 244  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
Macunovich found a relationship between the (smoothed) rate of change 
of the real Dow Jones index and the rate of change of cohort sizes,8 and 
Poterba tested the relationship between various indicators of demography 
and prices of  and returns on equity, concluding that the retiring of  the 
baby-boom generation would have only a small effect on asset prices.9 On 
the theoretical side, Robin Brooks and Andrew Abel pioneered the use of 
equilibrium models to study the effect of demography.10  Both used a Dia- 
mond model with random birth rates."1  Brooks found that demography 
had a small effect  on real rates of return and that the equity premium 
shrinks when the population is relatively young. Abel's  model was not 
calibrated, but a calibrated version of it was studied by Monika Butler and 
Philipp Harms, who concluded that the variation of the labor supply could 
smooth out some of the effects  of a demographic shock such as a baby 
boom.12  Bakshi and Chen had used  an infinite-horizon, representative- 
agent pricing model  to  account for the behavior of  security prices,  in 
which the age of the representative agent was the population average. A 
key assumption was that the relative risk aversion of the representative 
agent is an increasing function of the average age.'3 
Our  approach  and  our  conclusions  differ  from  those  of  earlier 
researchers in several respects. First, we  study a model in which large 
cohorts are deterministically followed  by  small cohorts in  a recurring 
cycle, as has been the case for the past century in the United States, rather 
than a stochastic birth model in which a large cohort might be followed by 
an even larger cohort. Second, we assume preferences for which saving is 
relatively  insensitive  to  interest rates. Third, we  take as our reference 
point a model in which a fixed quantity of land produces a fixed output 
per period, and then move to models with endogenous capital and adjust- 
ment costs. Taking this approach, we find that the demographic effect on 
PE ratios is larger than our predecessors have suggested. Finally, in con- 
trast to Brooks and Bakshi and Chen, we find that the equity premium is 
smaller when the population of savers is older, thus reinforcing the demo- 
graphic effect, as has been the case historically. 
8.  Macunovich (1997, 2002). 
9.  Poterba (2001). 
10.  Brooks (1998, 2002); Abel (2001, 2003). 
11.  Diamond (1965). 
12.  Butler and Harms (2001). 
13.  The existing literature has been admirably summarized by Young (2002). John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  245 
The first section of the paper studies the equilibria of a simple deter- 
ministic model in which generations are alternately large and small, peri- 
ods last for twenty years, and equity in a fixed asset ("land" or "trees") 
yields a constant stream of dividends each period. The sizes of the genera- 
tions, and the dividends and wages received by the young and the middle- 
aged,  are chosen  in accordance with historical averages for the United 
States. This certainty model gives the order of magnitude of the change in 
security prices that can be attributed to demographic change: even when 
cohort sizes  fluctuate by 50 percent, output increases by only 7 percent 
when  the large generation is  in its peak earning years-yet  PE ratios 
increase by 130 percent. We show that the lower the intertemporal elas- 
ticity of substitution in preferences, the greater the fluctuation in equity 
prices. 
In the second section we show that the qualitative behavior of the equi- 
librium is not significantly changed when the model is enriched to accom- 
modate  more  realistic  features  such  as  children,  Social  Security,  or 
bequests.  Children and Social  Security both reinforce the demographic 
effect  on  asset prices,  whereas bequests  attenuate it, but when  all  are 
taken together at levels  calibrated to fit the U.S. data, there is not much 
difference. The equilibria of our model can also be related to the equilib- 
ria of the standard  Diamond model with endogenous capital. By introduc- 
ing  adjustment costs  for capital, we  obtain a parameterized family  of 
models,  which includes  at one extreme the Diamond model,  with zero 
adjustment costs,  and at the other extreme models  with  progressively 
higher adjustment costs whose equilibria converge to the equilibrium of 
the land economy.  The possibility  that savings can go into new  capital 
instead of  pushing up the price of  existing  capital reduces the demo- 
graphic variation in rates of return and in equity prices. However, since 
there is a lag between physical investment and increased output, the vari- 
ation in price-dividend ratios due to demographics can be as high in the 
Diamond model as in the exchange model with fixed land. 
In the paper's third section we show how shortening the time periods 
reveals  the  relationship  between  demographic  structure and  security 
prices  in  its  most  striking form: in  the  stationary equilibrium, equity 
prices are precisely in phase with the demographic structure, attaining a 
maximum when the number of middle-aged agents is at a maximum and 
the number of young agents is at a minimum, and attaining a minimum 
when the cohort numbers are interchanged. Rates of return, on the other 246  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
hand, are not in phase with the demographic cycle. The maximum for the 
rate of return  occurs in the middle of the ascending phase of equity prices, 
when the increase in the MY ratio is at its maximum, inducing a large 
capital gain; the minimum rate of  return occurs  in  the middle  of  the 
descending phase of equity prices, when the decrease in the MY ratio and 
the capital loss  are the greatest. Thus, in the absence of  shocks to the 
economy,  a cyclical  birth process translates into a cyclical  behavior of 
equity prices  and interest rates, with  short-term interest rates leading 
equity prices by half a phase, because equity prices move with the MY 
ratio whereas short-term  interest rates move with the change in this ratio. 
In the fourth section we add uncertainty in wages and dividends to the 
model. In the postwar period in the United States, equity prices in bull 
markets have had peak-to-trough ratios of the order of 5 or 6, whereas the 
pure demographic model delivers increments of the order of 2 or 3. Thus 
"other  forces" must contribute a factor of order 2.5 to 3 to the changes in 
stock prices. The periods in which middle-aged agents were numerous 
relative to the young (the 1950s and early 1960s, and the late 1980s and 
the 1990s) were also periods in which the economy was subject to posi- 
tive  shocks,  whereas the period of  the  1970s,  when the baby-boomers 
were young, was marked by negative shocks (oil shortages and inflation). 
Thus we add business cycle  shocks to incomes and dividends and calcu- 
late the stationary Markov equilibrium of  the resulting economy  by  a 
method similar to that recently used by George Constantinides, John B. 
Donaldson,  and Rajnish Mehra."4  With  these  shocks,  our model  can 
deliver variations in PE ratios of the order of 5 or 6. 
The equity premium (the excess  return stocks earn over the riskless 
interest rate) is the new variable of  interest in the stochastic economy. 
Previous work has suggested that the equity premium observed histori- 
cally is difficult to reconcile with a rational expectations model, on two 
counts. First, the historical equity premium is too large to be rationalized 
by reasonable levels  of risk aversion.15  Second, and more important for 
us, the observation, exploited by Bakshi and Chen, that young people are 
more  risk-tolerant than old  people  suggests  that the  equity  premium 
should be smallest when the proportion of young people is highest, but 
this is exactly contrary to the historical record.  16 
14.  Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002). 
15.  Mehra and Prescott (1985). 
16.  Bakshi and Chen (1994). John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  247 
Our stochastic model sheds some light on the second problem. If there 
is  a strong demographic effect,  then the numerous young  (and the few 
contemporaneous middle-aged)  should rationally anticipate that invest- 
ment returns will  be relatively high. Since wages  and dividends do not 
vary as dramatically with demographic shifts as do financial returns, they 
should anticipate that a relatively large fraction of their future wealth will 
come from holding risky equity capital. Although their average risk toler- 
ance is higher, their average exposure to risk is also higher, and so we find 
that in our model the equity premium is larger when stock prices are low, 
which is consistent with the historical record. 
As for the problem that the historically observed equity premium in the 
United States is above the ex ante equity premium generated by standard 
models, we have little new to contribute. We impose limited participation 
in equity markets (confining such participation to 50 percent of the popu- 
lation, a proportion consistent with recent history), and we find that the 
equity premium rises  in our model,  while  preserving the demographic 
effect on equity prices. As is now standard,  we attribute  the larger histor- 
ical ex post equity premium to chance.'7 
In the paper'  s fifth section we compare the results of the model with 
the  stylized  facts  on  the  bond  and  equity  markets  for  the  period 
1910-2002.  The  variables that most  closely  fit the predictions of  the 
model are the PE ratio and the rate of return  on equity. Since 1945 the PE 
ratio has strikingly followed  the cyclical  pattern of the MY ratio in the 
population, whereas the rate of return  on equity has a significant relation- 
ship with the changes  in the MY ratio, as predicted by the model. The 
behavior of real interest rates departs much more from the predictions of 
the model, and only after 1965 does the real interest rate have a significant 
relationship with the change in the MY ratio. Moreover, interest rate vari- 
ations have been smaller than in the calibrated model, with the result that 
the level and variability of the equity premium are greater in the data than 
in the model. This section of the paper also briefly presents some evidence 
on  equity  markets and demography for  Germany, France, the  United 
Kingdom, and Japan. The paper concludes with some cautionary remarks 
on the use of the model for predicting the future course of prices in an era 
of globalization of equity markets. 
17.  See, for example, Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995). 248  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
A Simple Model with Demographic  Fluctuation 
Consider an overlapping-generations exchange economy with a single 
good (income), in which the economic life of an agent lasts for three peri- 
ods: young adulthood, middle age,  and retirement. All  agents have the 
same preferences and endowments and differ only by the date at which 
they enter the economic scene. Their preferences over lifetime consump- 
tion streams are represented by a standard discounted sum of expected 
utilities: 
(1)  U(c) = E[u(cy) +  6U(c-)  +  62U(C  )],  6 >  0, 
where  c =  (cY,  cm, Cr) denotes  the random  consumption  stream  of  an agent 
when young, middle-aged, and retired. For the calibration, u will be taken 
to be a power utility function 
1  -o  u(x)= =  x1c,  au>O, 
l-oc 
where oc  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (and 1/o the intertem- 
poral elasticity of substitution). Since a "period"  in the model represents 
twenty years in the lifetime of an agent, we take the discount factor to be 
6 = 0.5 (corresponding to an annual discount factor of 0.97). 
In this section we outline the basic features of the model and explain 
how we choose  average values for the calibration: these average values 
can be taken as the characteristics of a deterministic exchange economy 
whose equilibrium is easy to compute, and this provides a first approxi- 
mation for the effect of demographic fluctuations on the stock market. 
Each agent has an endowment w =  (wy,  w-, 0), which can be interpreted 
as the agent's  labor income  in the three periods (income  in retirement 
being zero). There are two financial instruments-a  riskless bond and an 
equity contract-which  agents can trade to redistribute their income over 
time (and, in the stochastic version of the model, to alter their exposure to 
risk). The (real) bond pays one unit of income (for sure) next period and is 
in zero net supply; the equity contract is an infinite-lived security in posi- 
tive supply (normalized to 1), which pays a dividend each period. Agents 
own the financial instruments only by virtue of having bought them in the 
past: they are not initially in any agent's endowment. In this section the John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  249 
dividends and wage income are nonstochastic, so that the bond and equity 
are perfect substitutes; later, where we introduce random shocks to both 
dividends and wages, bonds and equity cease to be perfect substitutes. 
Since we want to study the effect of the fluctuations in the age compo- 
sition of the population on capital market prices rather  than the effect of a 
general growth of  the population, we  assume that the model  has been 
"detrended" so  that the systematic  sources of  growth in dividends and 
wages arising from population growth, capital accumulation, and techni- 
cal progress are factored out. The sole source of variation in total output 
comes from the cyclical change in the demographic structure,  to which we 
now turn, and from the random business cycle  shocks to be introduced 
later. 
Demographic Structure 
Live births in the population induce the subsequent age structure  of the 
population: figure 1 shows annual live births for the United States during 
the twentieth century. If all live births over twenty consecutive years are 
grouped into a cohort, then the number of births can be approximated by 
five twenty-year periods, which create alternately large and small cohorts, 
as shown in figure 1. 
We  seek the simplest way  of  modeling  this alternating sequence  of 
generation sizes: time is divided into a sequence of twenty-year periods. 
To be commensurate with this, an individual's "biological life" is divided 
into four periods: from age 0 to age 19 the agent is a child, from 20 to 39 
the agent is young, from 40 to 59 the agent is middle-aged, and from 60 to 
79 the agent is retired. The "economic life" during which the agent earns 
income and trades on the financial markets consists of the last three peri- 
ods. We assume that in each odd period a large cohort (N) enters the eco- 
nomic  scene  as young,  and that in each even period a small cohort (n) 
enters. Thus there are N young, n middle-aged, and N old in every odd 
period (pyramid A1,),  and n young, N middle-aged, and n old in every even 
period (pyramid A2). 
Because the typical lifetime income of an individual is low in youth, 
high in middle age, and low or nonexistent in retirement, agents typically 
seek to borrow in their youth, invest in equity and bonds in middle age, 
and live  off this middle-age investment in their retirement. As we  shall 
see, this life-cycle  portfolio behavior implies that the relative sizes of the 250  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
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middle-aged and young cohorts play an important  role in determining the 
behavior of equilibrium bond and equity prices. For the alternating  cohort 
structure  just described, the medium-to-young cohort ratio (MY ratio, for 
short) alternates between n/N <  1 in odd periods and Nln  >  1 in even 
periods. 
The demographic structure shown in figure 1 is not perfectly station- 
ary. There were 52 million live births in the Great Depression generation 
born from 1925 to 1944, and 79 million in the baby boom from 1945 to 
1964; these two generations traded with each other as middle-aged and 
young in the period 1965-84.  Between 1965 and 1984 births fell, but only 
to 69 million. We refer to this baby-bust generation as "generation X" or 
"the Xers" for short; the baby-boom and Xer generations have traded  with 
each other from 1985 to the present. The "echo boom generation" born 
since  1985 seems headed for the same order of magnitude as the baby- 
boom generation; this generation and the Xer generation will trade with 
each other from 2005 through 2024. John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  251 
In order to mimic actual history with a stationary  economy, we are thus 
led to study two cases: in the first, n = 52 and N = 79, the relative sizes of 
the Great Depression  and baby-boom  generations. This is  the case  for 
which the demographic effect is the strongest and whose equilibrium is 
studied in the main text of the paper. We also compute the equilibrium 
for a second case in which N is kept at 79 and the smaller cohort size is 
n = 69. The equilibrium values for this case are given in appendix C. 
Calibrating the age pyramid using the number of live births neglects 
immigration, which  plays  an important role in the demography of  the 
United States. We show in appendix A, however, that taking immigrants 
into account essentially  leaves  the MY ratio unchanged for the periods 
1965-84  and 1985-2004,  which we have taken as reference values for the 
calibration. 
Wage Income 
The exchange economy is viewed as an economy with fixed production 
plans. Equity in land or trees yields a steady stream of dividends D each 
period, and each young and middle-aged worker produces output wy and 
wmi,  respectively. To calibrate the relative shares of wage income going to 
young and middle-aged agents, we draw on data from the Bureau of the 
Census shown in figure 2: the maximum ratio of the average annual real 
incomes of agents in the age groups 45-54  and 25-34  is  1.54: we round 
this to 1.5 and calibrate the model on the basis of a wage income of wy  = 2 
for each young agent and wm  = 3 for each middle-aged agent. Since the 
agents have homothetic (constant elasticity of substitution) preferences, 
the absolute levels of endowments and dividends do not influence the rel- 
ative prices  or relative consumption levels,  which  will  be the primary 
focus of the study. 
Since the wage income of middle-aged agents is greater than that of the 
young, the total wage is greater in even periods, when the middle-aged 
generation is  large, than in odd periods, when the young generation is 
large. Since the active population is constant, this increase in wages has to 
be interpreted as coming from an increase in the average productivity of 
labor: implicitly the model presumes that the middle-aged are more expe- 
rienced and productive than the young, since they are paid higher wages. 
When (N, n) = (79, 52), total wages alternate between 341 = (79 x 3) + 
(52 x 2) and 314 = (79 x 2) + (52 x 3). When the demographic structure  is 252  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
Figure 2. Average  Household  Income,  by Age of Head of Household,  1967-2001 
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Source: U.S. Bureau  of the Census, "Historical  Income Tables-Households," table H-lOa. 
less skewed, as in the economy with (N, n) = (79, 69), total wage income 
alternates  between 375 = (79 x 3) + (69 x 2) and 365 = (79 x 2) + (69 x 3). 
Dividends 
Land produces output, which is distributed as dividends to the equity 
holders. We take the ratio of dividends to wages to be of the same order of 
magnitude as the ratio of (generalized) dividends to (generalized) wages 
in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).'8 More precisely, 
we define as generalized wages the sum of the NIPA categories "compen- 
sation to employees,"  "supplements to wages  and salaries," and half of 
"proprietors'  income." The rationale for this is that "proprietors'  income" 
includes the net income of unincorporated businesses  (farmers, doctors, 
lawyers,  partners, small  business  proprietors), which  is  really  wage 
income from the perspective of our model.19  We define generalized divi- 
18. The  reference  data  set is the annual  National  Income  by Type  of Income  from 1959 
to 1999,  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis. 
19. McGrattan  and  Prescott  (2000) attribute  80 percent  of proprietors'  income  to wages 
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dends as the sum of "rental income," "dividends paid by corporations," 
"net interest," and the other half of "proprietors'  income." These are the 
payments to capital, which are priced in long-lived securities. We postu- 
late that the retained earnings of corporations are used to finance growth, 
and, since  our model does not have growth and investment, we  do not 
take them into account. On average the ratio of generalized dividends to 
generalized wages is 0.19.  Thus, in the economy in which (N, n) =  (79, 
52), we take D = 0.19[(341  + 314)/2]  = 62, and when (N, n) = (79, 69) we 
take D = 0.19[(375  + 365)/2]  = 70. 
For the demographic structure (N, n) =  (79,  52),  in which there is  a 
large variation in the cohort ratios between odd and even periods, total 
income (wages plus dividends) is on average 7.2 percent higher in even 
than in odd periods. For the case (N, n) = (79, 69), with its smaller varia- 
tion in the cohort ratio, the output difference is 2.3 percent. 
Pure Demographic Equilibrium 
When the only source of change in the economy comes from fluctua- 
tions in the demographic structure, it is straightforward  to describe and 
solve for the stationary equilibrium. Let qtb  be the price of the bond at time 
t, that is, the amount of the good required in period t to buy one unit of the 
good in the next period; then qtb  =  1/(1 + rt), where rt is the interest rate 
from period t to period t + 1. It is easy to show that an equilibrium exists 
in which qtb =  q1 whenever t is odd, and qtb  =  q2 whenever t is even. Since 
agents can use the bond or the equity contract to transfer income across 
the different periods of their life,  they can equalize the present value of 
their consumption to the present value of their income. Agents in the large 
cohorts, who are young in odd periods, choose a consumption stream (CY, 
Cm,  Cr) so as to maximize the utility function (equation 1) subject to the 
budget constraint 
(2)  CY  +  qCm  +  qq2Cr  = wY  + qlw  + qq2Wr  = 2 + q,  3, 
whereas  agents in  the  small  cohorts,  who  are young  in  even  periods, 
choose  (cy, cm, Cr)  so  as  to  maximize  the  utility  function  in  equation  1 
under the budget constraint 
(3)  Cy  +q2c  +  q1q2Cr  = wY  +q2w  +  q1q2Wr  = 2 + q23. 
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(4)  NCY +nct  + NCr  =(Nx2)  + (nx3)  + D 
ncy +NCm  +ncr  =(nx2)+(Nx3)+D. 
Since there is no uncertainty, the bond and the equity contract must be 
perfect substitutes in each period. From the no-arbitrage  property of equi- 
librium, the rate of return on the equity market and on the bond market 
must be the same. Thus, if bond prices alternate between q1 and q2, the 
price of equity must alternate  between ql and q2, where 
D+q?  1  D+q e  =1+. 
-  = 1 +  rl,  =_  =  I +  r2 
qe  q1  qe  q2 
If q1 <q2, or equivalently if r1 > r2, then it must be that ql <  q2e  thus inter- 
est rates are high when equity prices are rising and low when equity prices 
are falling. Solving the rate-of-return  equations yields the following rela- 
tionship between bond and equity prices: 
(5)  qe ID=(qlq2+q1)1(1-q,q2)  and 
qe  ID=  (qlq2  +  q2)I(l-q,q2). 
Note  that the same result could have been  obtained by  expressing the 
price of equity as the discounted value of its dividends: 
q = Dql  + Dqlq2 + Dqlq2q, +  Dq,q2qlq2  +  -- 
qe  = Dq2 + Dq2q, +  Dq2qlq2  +  Dq2q,q2q,  +*-  - 
A convenient way of assessing the level of equity prices is to compute 
the price-dividend (PD)  ratio, defined by  PD(i)  =  qIel(DI20), i =  1, 2, 
where dividends are expressed on a yearly basis. To compare the results 
of the model with the well-publicized price-earnings ratios used in valu- 
ing corporate equity, a good rule of thumb is to divide by 2, since on aver- 
age corporate firms distribute half their earnings as dividends.20  We will 
often refer to PE  B  PD/2 as the "price-earnings ratio." In the same way, 
rather than report the interest rate for a twenty-year period, we report the 
annualized interest rate rian defined by (1 +  rIa9)20 = 1 + ri, for i = 1, 2. 
20. For 1951-2000 the average  payout  ratio  for firms  in the S&P 500 index  was 0.51. John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  255 
Properties of Equilibrium 
If the bond prices were to coincide with the consumer discount factor, 
q,  =  q2  =  0.5, then individuals would attempt to completely smooth their 
consumption, demanding the stream (cY,  cm, Cr)  = (2, 2, 2). But then, in the 
case where the population structure  is (N, n) = (79, 52), in odd periods the 
aggregate excess demand for consumption would be 79(2 -  2) + 52(2 -  3) 
+ 79(2  -  0)  -  62  = 44,  and in  even  periods  it would  be  52(0)  + 79(-1)  + 
52(2)  -  62 = -37.  Thus in odd periods there is excess  demand for con- 
sumption, as retired agents consume beyond their income more than the 
middle-aged save for their retirement, whereas in even periods, when the 
middle-aged cohort is large, there is excess  demand for saving as those 
households seek to invest for their retirement. To clear markets, interest 
rates must adjust, discouraging consumption (stimulating saving) in odd 
periods, and discouraging saving (stimulating consumption) in even peri- 
ods: as a result, equilibrium bond prices must be below 0.5 in odd periods 
and above 0.5 in even periods. By no arbitrage,  land prices must be higher 
in even than in odd periods. How far interest rates and land prices must 
adjust depends on how big a price change is required to move consumers 
away from equal consumption in each period of their lives, which in turn 
is connected to the relative strength of income and substitution effects, as 
will be shown below. 
Here is another way of understanding how the demographic effect on 
equity prices can be so large, and how it is reinforced by rational optimiza- 
tion.  Suppose  agents myopically  consume  2  when  young  (thus saving 
nothing), consume 2 again when middle-aged (investing all their savings 
in land), and finally sell all their land in old age to finance their retirement 
consumption. The price of land would then be 79 in even periods, with 
their large middle-aged population, and 52 in odd periods, with their small 
middle-aged population. Myopic behavior in which the middle-aged do all 
the saving explains a roughly 50 percent (79/52 -  1) variation in equity 
values, even though total output varies by only 7 percent. 
Rationality boosts  the effect: rational agents would perceive  that, in 
following  the myopic  strategy, the large generations would end up with 
consumption of approximately (2, 2,  1.3) in youth, middle age, and old 
age, respectively, whereas small generations would end up with consump- 
tion approximately equal to (2, 2, 2.5). Anticipating this drop in old-age 
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drastic jumps in consumption, the large generations would save more in 
middle age, and the small generations less, reinforcing the demographic 
effect. 
If agents foresaw the demographics forty years ahead (which is possi- 
ble,  since the size  of the current child cohort gives  a good idea of  the 
middle-aged cohort forty years hence), the large generations would also 
tend to save more when young, buying, say, 30 percent of the land with 
the purpose of  holding it until old age. If they did not use  the land to 
increase their middle-aged consumption, this would still further  reinforce 
the demographic effect: 30 percent of the land would be removed from 
the market in both periods, and their middle-aged savings would rise by 
30 percent of land dividends. 
The only damper on the demographic effect  on equity prices is that 
rational agents will  anticipate that the return on land between odd and 
even periods will be greater than the return between even and odd peri- 
ods,  rendering middle-aged  consumption  relatively  cheap  for  the  big 
generations and relatively  expensive  for the small generations. If their 
preferences have  a large substitution effect,  middle-aged  consumption 
for  the  large  generation  will  increase,  thus  partially  reducing  their 
middle-aged  savings  and mitigating the demographic effect.  When the 
risk aversion parameter in the utility function is ox  = 4, the intertemporal 
elasticity  of  substitution  of  consumption  is  1/4,  and the  substitution 
effect is small. 
Since in our model agents are always saving (for their retirement  years) 
when middle-aged, the high returns to land in odd periods and the low 
returns in  even  periods  favor  agents born in  small  cohorts  (who  are 
middle-aged when returns  are high) relative to those born in large cohorts. 
We call this the favored  cohort effect. This income effect just offsets the 
substitution effect  when ux  = 4: large and small cohorts have the same 
middle-age consumption. 
Calculating the stationary equilibrium for the economy  with (N, n) = 
(79,  52)  and utility function parameter cx  =  4  gives  the equity prices, 
annual interest rates, and PE ratios 
(qle,  q2  ran,  r2jn PE,, PE2) = (52, 120, 6.4%, -  0.3%, 8.4, 19.4), 
and the consumption streams C=  (CY,  Cm,  Cr),  c =  (cy, cm, cr)  and utilities 
(U, u) for large and small generations John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  257 
(C, c, U, u) = ((1.8, 2, 1.7), (2.4, 2, 2.3), (-0.1, -  0.05)). 
As expected, when the large cohort is young and the small cohort middle- 
aged, the equity price is low,  with a PE ratio around 8; when the large 
cohort moves into middle age and seeks to save for retirement, the equity 
price is more than twice as high (q2  /qe  =  2.3), and the PE ratio increases 
to 19. The variation in equity prices (or equivalently, the variation in PE 
ratios) is roughly equal to the variation in the MY ratio, namely, 2.3  = 
(79/52)1(52/79).  When  the  equity  price  is  low  and  is  anticipated to 
increase,  the  annual real interest rate is  high  (6.4  percent); it falls  to 
-0.3  percent when the equity price is high and going to decrease. As pre- 
dicted by the favored cohort effect,  the smaller generation is better off 
(-0.05  > -0.1). 
When the demographic structure (N, n) is less skewed, the disequilib- 
rium implied when the bond prices are equal (q1 = q2) is less pronounced, 
so that bond and equity prices do not need to fluctuate as much to estab- 
lish equilibrium. With (N, n) = (79, 69), equity prices are again roughly 
proportional to MY ratios: 89/67 = 12.6/9.5  = (79/69)1(69/79). For a given 
demographic structure,  if the aversion to consumption variability is lower 
(that is, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is higher), the varia- 
tion in prices needed to establish an equilibrium is also lower. Table 1 
shows  the effect  on equilibrium prices of  decreasing the difference in 
cohort  sizes  and  of  varying  the  coefficient  ux, which  determines  the 
intertemporal  elasticity of substitution of consumption (equal to l1/X).  The 
rule that equity prices are proportional to MY ratios holds very closely 
when ux  = 4, but only approximately for ux  ? 4. 
Robustness of Pure Demographic  Equilibrium 
Family, Bequests, and Social Security 
The model of the previous section can be viewed as the simplest model 
for  studying the consequences  for the  stock  market of  fluctuations in 
demographic structure.  However, it abstracts from a number of important 
features that alter agents' needs to redistribute income over time. In par- 
ticular, the presence of bequests, Social Security payments in retirement, 
or the fact that young agents have to provide for their children alters the 
need for intertemporal savings. In this section we study how the predic- 
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Implicit in the model is that parents from a large cohort have, on aver- 
age, small families-each  agent of a large cohort has v1 = n/N children- 
whereas parents from a small cohort have, on average, large families, v2 = 
Nln children. The Easterlin hypothesis provides an explanation for such 
fluctuations in the fertility ratio,21 which can be rephrased  in the setting of 
our model as follows.  The young of any generation form their material 
aspirations as children in the households of their parents: in deciding their 
family size,  they compare the material prospects they can offer to their 
children with the aspirations they have formed as children in their par- 
ents' household. Since the young in a small cohort have greater lifetime 
income than their parents, who come from a large cohort, they feel that 
they can offer to their children material conditions that exceed their aspi- 
rations, and are led to choose a large family size. Conversely, the young 
of a large cohort facing difficult conditions but having formed high aspi- 
rations choose  a small family size. This suggests a simple, albeit highly 
stylized, way of linking the choice of family size (fertility) to the under- 
lying economic conditions. 
Let us now take into account the fact that parents provide for the con- 
sumption of their children. If v denotes the number of children, then the 
utility of  a young parent is  VXu(ck)  +  U(CP),  where  Ck  denotes the con- 
sumption of a child and cP the parent's consumption, and X is the weight 
given by the parent to a child's utility.22  Assume that agents give bequests 
to their children, and let b denote the bequest transferred  by retired par- 
ents to their middle-aged children. We take the utility in the retired period 
to be  U(Cr,  b)  =  (cr)l-PbP,  0  <  j3  <  1. In practice,  individuals  end  up with 
wealth at the time of their death, both because they hold precautionary 
balances  against the  uncertain time  of  death and because  they  derive 
direct utility from the bequests they leave to their children.23  We model 
the combination of  these two motives  by assuming that the utility is  a 
function of the total bequest and not of the bequest per child. The utility 
function of the representative agent, which replaces equation 1, is given by 
(6)  U(c, b) =  1  [v(ck)l--  + (cP)l-a  + 6i(c')'-o  + 62((cr)P  bP)j. 
21. Easterlin  (1987). 
22. This is the specification  used  by Brooks  (2002). 
23. See Modigliani  (1986, 1988) for a discussion  and  estimation  of the proportion  of 
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To complete the model we add the transfers to an agent's lifetime income 
arising from a pay-as-you-go  Social  Security system.  We  assume that 
each retired agent, regardless of cohort size, receives a transfer 0 > 0 and 
that the labor income received in pyramids A1 and A2 iS taxed at rates t1 
and t2,  respectively, where 1  and 2  are chosen so that the Social Security 
budget is balanced. 
The lifetime budget constraint of an agent who is young in pyramid Ai, 
i = 1, 2 can then be written as 
(7)  vcI  '  c[+  qicm + qiqi+  (c  + bi) = W(1  t,i) 
+qi  wm(1-ti+i  )+-)'  + qiqi+,0, i = 1, 2, 
Vi+1 
where i + 1 is taken modulo 2 (1 + 1 = 2, 2 + 1 = 1). In a stationary equi- 
librium with children, bequests, and Social Security, young agents in pyra- 
mid Ai maximize equation 6  subject to equation 7, the market-clearing 
equations 4 hold, and the Social Security tax satisfies the balanced-budget 
equations 
(Nwv + nw-  )tl  = NO  (nwy + Nw  )t2  = nO. 
The equilibrium equity prices are then given in terms of (q,  q2) and D by 
equation 5. 
Since the first-order conditions imply that X(ck)-0  =  (c">)-, the weight 
Xl"'  determines the ratio of the consumption of a child to the consumption 
of the parent (which in the literature is called the child-equivalent con- 
sumption). Since we can find estimates for this ratio in the empirical liter- 
ature, it is convenient to parameterize the model by the child-equivalent 
consumption rl and to choose  X = rl(X.  The equilibrium depends on three 
new coefficients  (rl, ,,  0), which parameterize the child-equivalent con- 
sumption, the strength of the bequest motive,  and the magnitude of the 
Social Security transfer. By setting two of these coefficients equal to zero, 
we can study how each parameter affects the equilibrium; by choosing a 
representative value for each parameter, we can examine their combined 
effect on the equilibrium. We take the consumption of a child to be half 
the consumption of an adult parent (rl = 0.5);24  we take ,  = 0.3 to generate 
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a  ratio  of  bequests  to  aggregate  income  between  15.5  percent  and 
18.5 percent, which is the consensus  estimate reported by Modigliani.25 
At the end of the 1  990s the ratio of Social Security transfers and Medicare 
benefits to national income was of the order of  8 percent: by choosing 
0 = 0.5  as the Social  Security transfer per capita, we  obtain a ratio of 
Social Security transfers  to total income of 10.5 percent in pyramid A1  and 
6.45  percent in pyramid A2. Table 2 shows the separate and combined 
effects of the three parameters on the equilibrium. The preference coeffi- 
cient is set to oc  = 4, and the demographic parameters  are (N, n) = (79, 52). 
Poterba has argued that the presence of bequests will attenuate, if not 
cancel,  the decrease in security prices that is expected when the baby- 
boomers go into retirement, since they will  not attempt to sell  all their 
securities.26  However, if all generations transferred the same fraction of 
their wealth as bequests, it still implies that a large generation will need to 
sell the share of its wealth that it needs as retirement income to a smaller 
generation of middle-aged savers. Abel has shown that, in his model with 
production and two-period-lived agents, the presence of bequests does not 
change  the equilibrium.27  In our model  adding a bequest motive  does 
lower the ratio of equity prices, but it does not cancel the effect: the main 
effect is to lower the interest rate, since agents in both cohorts have more 
income  in middle age by virtue of the bequests from their parents, and 
thus save more for retirement. The smaller ratio of equity prices comes 
partly from the fact that the small generation, when middle-aged, receives 
a larger bequest per capita (0.7/v1 = 1.06) than the large generation (1/v2 = 
0.66), the higher income tending to compensate for the smaller size of the 
cohort in the aggregate saving function. 
The  other parameters, the  child-equivalent  consumption fl  and the 
Social  Security benefit 0, have the reverse effect, increasing the ratio of 
equity prices and increasing interest rates. The need to provide for chil- 
dren tends  to  increase  the  demand for borrowing or,  equivalently,  to 
decrease the saving rate in each pyramid. Since small generations have 
more children, their savings  drop more, thereby increasing the  demo- 
graphic  effect  on  equity  prices.  Introducing Social  Security  benefits 
decreases the income of agents when they are working and increases their 
25.  Modigliani (1988). 
26.  Poterba (2001). 
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income when retired, thus also decreasing the saving rate. When the three 
effects are combined, the forces causing interest rates to be high prevail, 
lowering the PE ratios. But the ratio of equity prices is of the same order 
of  magnitude as in the simple model. If this more detailed institutional 
model were chosen as the reference model, we would need to increase the 
discount factor to obtain more realistic interest rates and PE ratios. For 
example, with 6 =  (0.99)20  = 0.82 and the same parameters as in the last 
two columns of table 2, the equilibrium is 
(qe,  qe  an  r2an  PE, PE2) = (45, 81, 6%, 1.4%, 7.2, 13). 
The relatively low  discount factor 6 = (0.97)20 = 0.5 used in the simple 
exchange model can then be viewed as a convenient proxy for these more 
realistic institutional features that are left out of  the model  and which 
lower the saving rate. 
Comparing Equilibria of Exchange and Production Economies 
In this section we study the effect of replacing the assumption that the 
single  asset is in fixed supply with the assumption that the asset is pro- 
ducible  "capital." Variations  in  savings  can  now  be  channeled  into 
changes in the capital stock, reducing the demographic variation in inter- 
est rates and equity values.  However,  since there is  a lag between the 
moment when saving occurs and the time when output and dividends are 
generated, the price-dividend ratio is as sensitive to demography as it was 
before.28 Finally,  we  show  that in  the presence of  adjustment costs- 
which permit equity prices to differ from the capital stock-the  equilib- 
ria of the production economy become  similar to those of the exchange 
economy  and essentially  coincide  when the adjustment costs  are suffi- 
ciently high. 
Consider an economy with the same consumer side as in the exchange 
economy, but in which wages and dividends are endogenous. Each agent 
is endowed with one unit of labor when young and middle-aged and sup- 
plies labor inelastically.  The efficiency  of a unit of young labor is two- 
28.  In this section we assume that the representative firm has no debt and finances its 
investment from retained earnings. For an arbitrary  financial policy, the ratio that we com- 
pute is the ratio of the market value of the firm to its "net"  dividend, that is, the sum of what 
is paid to shareholders and bondholders minus new borrowing from bondholders or new 
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thirds the efficiency  of a unit of middle-aged labor. The effective  labor 
supply in pyramids A1  and A2 iS  thus 
(8)  L=213N+n,  L2=213n+N. 
There is a single (representative, infinitely lived) firm, which uses capital 
and labor to produce the single output with the production function F(K, 
L) = AKaLl a. At the beginning  of period  t the firm has  Kt units  of  capital, 
inherited from period t -  1. It hires Lt  units of (effective) labor paid at the 
wage rate wt, and after producing F(Kt, Lt) units of  output is left with 
(1 -  g)Kt units of capital, where g, with 0 < g < 1, is the depreciation rate. 
The firm then decides to spend It on investment, where investment is sub- 
ject to convex adjustment costs:29 
(9)  Kt+,  =  (1- _)K,  + It -  y(Kt+l  -  K )2, 
with y > 0. The cost of replacing the depreciated units gKt of capital is 
equal to  gKt, but if the firm wants to change its capital stock, then an 
adjustment cost,  which  is  convex  in the change  IK,+ -  KtI, has to be 
incurred. If y = 0, there is no adjustment cost, and the model is the stan- 
dard Diamond model. 
After paying for wages and investment, the firm distributes the rest of 
its output as dividends: 
(10)  Dt = F(Kt, LJ - wtLt  -  I,t. 
The stock market opens, and agents buy and sell shares of the firm at price 
qe.  For simplicity we assume that the bond is not used,30  and we define the 
rate of interest as the rate of return on equity: 
29.  We introduce a cost to modifying the level of capital to capture the fact that altering 
firm  size  by  introducing  new  plant  or  introducing  more  capital-intensive  technology 
involves  a cost over and above the cost of the materials involved, whereas the maintenance 
of depreciated capital involves no additional cost. We make the cost symmetric in increases 
or decreases of capital, since it is typically costly to uninstall used capital that is not worth 
maintaining. Equation 9 differs from the equation for the evolution of capital K,? = G(K,, 
I)  introduced by Basu (1987)  and adopted by Abel  (2003),  where G is  a Cobb-Douglas 
function. The latter equation expresses decreasing returns to investment but does not nec- 
essarily involve a cost for changing the level of capital. 
30.  Introducing borrowing and lending on the bond merely induces indeterminacy in 
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(1  1)  1  + 6  = D,+l  +  qt+l 
qe 
Let (wi, q  e,  ri) denote the wage, equity price, and interest rate in pyramid 
Ai, i =  1, 2; similarly, let (ci, Zei)  =  (c,  c,  ci  zyi z'i) denote the con- 
sumption stream and equity holdings of an agent who is young in pyramid 
Ai, and let (Ki, Ii, Di) denote the capital inherited by the firm, the invest- 
ment undertaken  to form the capital next period, and the dividend distrib- 
uted in pyramid Ai, i =  1, 2.  (ci, Zei) maximizes  the utility function in 
equation 1 subject to the sequence of budget constraints 
(12)  cY  = 2/3wi -qeZYi 
CT=  wi+  +  (Di+  +  qe+ )z,i  -qe  Zin. 
cir  ( Di  +  qie  )eji 
where  i +  1 is  taken  modulo  2 (1 +  1 =  2, 2 +  1 =  1). Note  that  these 
sequential budget constraints are equivalent to the single lifetime budget 
constraint 
ci + qic, + qiq+Ic  = 2/3wi  + qiwi+, 
with present-value prices qi = 1/(1 + ri), which can be taken as equilibrat- 
ing variables. 
The firm is assumed to maximize its market value-the  present value 
of its dividends-with  perfect foresight of future prices. Thus at each date 
t the choice of labor Lt must maximize F(Kt, Lt) -  wtLt  given Kt, and the 
choice of capital K,+1  must maximize 
-I,  (Kt+,, K,)+ 
I 
(F(K,+,,~  LI+l)  -  w,+I,L+,  -  I(K,+2,  K,+l  )), 
given  K,, L,+,, and K,2,  where It(Kt+, K)  is given by equation 9. This 
leads to the first-order conditions that define the optimal production plan 
of the firm in the stationary equilibrium: for i = 1, 2, 
FL'(Ki, L) = wi 
FL'(Ki+,, L+I)=  +=  + 2y(2  +  r,)(K,+,  -  K), 266  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
where we use the fact that Ki,2  =  Ki, and where L1 and L2 are given by 
equation 8, so that the labor market clears. The market-clearing condi- 
tions for the consumption good market are 
Ncy +ncm + Ncr +1  = F(K,, L) 
ncy + Nc  + nCr +I2 =F(K2,  L2), 
where Ii = I(Ki+l, Ky). The simplest approach is to find the equilibrium 
(ji, Ki, -i,  i = 1, 2),  with  the interest rates or, equivalently,  the present- 
value prices  (q-, q-2)  as equilibrating variables, and to deduce the financial 
variables  (Di, qie, fi)  using equations 10, 1  1, and 12. As in the exchange 
economy, the equity price is the present value of the dividends, which are 
now endogenous and vary between pyramids A1  and A2: 
(13)  qe  =  Di  (I  +  ;2  + (2)2  + * .)+ D1  (1 +  + (qq2)2  +  *.) 
Di+lqi  + D;@lq2 
I-qlq2 
By varying the adjustment cost parameter  y in the above model, we can 
now compare the equilibrium outcomes of a family of models of the stock 
market (table 3), starting with the Diamond equilibriumy = 0 and ending 
with y =  0.1,  for which  the equilibrium is  close  to that of  the simple 
exchange  economy  analyzed  above,  which  is  shown  in  the  last  two 
columns. In this family of models the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
is fixed at oc  = 4 and the demography parameters at (N, n) = (79, 52), and 
the production parameters  A, a, and g are chosen so that the depreciation 
parameter is  g  = 0.5  (yielding  depreciation of the order of  3 percent a 
year), and so that the Diamond equilibrium generates wages,  dividends, 
and output close  to those  of  the exchange  economy:  this leads  to the 
choice A = 4.2, a = 0.24. 
To compare the equilibria, let sy  =  q eZ  t and smt  =  q zt',1  denote the sav- 
ing of the representative young and the representative middle-aged agent, 
respectively, trading at date t. Since the total demand for equity must be 
equal to the one unit that exists, in equilibrium  the total saving of the active 
agents in the economy must be equal to the price of the equity, which itself 
is equal to the present value of the dividends. The steady-state equilibrium 
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(14)  NsY (r-  2)+nsm(r  r-)=  qe(r-,  D)  =  D2i+  DIq,q2 
1  -Dq1q2 
(15)  nsy(r2,  )+Nsm(r,)=qe(r2,1)=  Lh +  D2=  Irl 
1q2q 
In pyramid A, (equation 14), the young and middle-aged agents receive 
the current  interest rate r, on their savings; r2  affects the young because it 
is the rate of return  that they will obtain on their future savings in middle 
age, and r2 affects the current middle-aged because it is the rate of return 
that they have obtained on the (possibly negative) saving that they have 
done when young. The same holds for equation 15 with the roles of r, and 
r2  reversed. 
In the exchange equilibrium with fixed land, greater savings can be 
accommodated only by adjustments in the interest rate and the accompa- 
nying changes in the value of land. In the Diamond model, new  saving 
can instead be channeled into new capital, reducing the variation in inter- 
est rates, as seen in table 3. Furthermore,  because the investment appears 
as capital one  generation later, the large middle-aged cohort will  earn 
lower  wages,  because  it  will  work  with  the  smaller  capital  stock 
bequeathed by the previous small generation. This reduces their savings 
in middle age, and we  see that the variation in equity values falls from 
130 percent in the exchange economy to 40 percent in the pure Diamond 
model. 
On the other hand, the dividends D,  and D2 differ in a way that rein- 
forces the effect of the difference in rates of return on PD ratios: a lower 
r2 induces a higher investment I2: the savings of the large middle-aged 
cohort result in high investment for building the capital stock of the fol- 
lowing period. The high capital stock of pyramid A, leads to a large divi- 
dend DI, both because the economy is productive and because I, is low. 
The PD ratio is thus affected even more by demographics in the Diamond 
model than it is in the land model. 
Introducing a convex  adjustment cost tends to reduce the difference 
between  K1 and K2 and to  limit  investment to the replacement of  the 
depreciated capital. Dividends are then almost equal in the two pyramids, 
and the rates of return must vary more widely,  as in the exchange econ- 
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Finally, the less variable the rate of return,  the less marked the favored 
cohort effect.  The large cohort is first young and later retired in states 
where the effective  labor supply is  lower: in the Diamond equilibrium 
there is more capital in these states, and the output is the same as in the 
states where there is a large, productive middle-aged cohort. There is still 
an adverse effect of numbers, but it is much less marked than in the equi- 
librium where capital is constant and output varies. 
Equilibrium with Shorter Time Periods 
An  objection  commonly  presented to  the  idea  that the  increase  in 
equity prices during the 1990s was partly due to the saving behavior of 
the baby-boomers reaching middle age is that interest rates in the 1990s 
were not historically low.3'  The argument is that if the increase in prices 
resulted from a higher-than-usual propensity to save due to the presence 
of a large generation in its saving years, then this high propensity to save 
should have forced interest rates down. The model that we have studied so 
far  (with  three-period-lived  agents)  supports this  argument, since  the 
equity price  alternates between  high  values  (when the large cohort is 
middle-aged)  and low  values  (when  the  small cohort is  middle-aged), 
with the result that the rate of return-and  hence the interest rate-alter- 
nates between low and high values. High equity prices coincide with low 
interest rates and conversely. 
However,  the joint  dynamics of  interest rates and equity prices in a 
model with shorter time periods is, as we  shall now show, more subtle. 
We study how security prices behave when the three active twenty-year 
periods of an agent's life are each divided into five periods of four years, 
so that the economic life of an agent now lasts for fifteen periods. Adopt- 
ing a four-year period as the basic unit of time keeps the calculation man- 
ageable  and  suffices  to  show  how  a  more  detailed  statement of  the 
changing sizes of age cohorts over time carves itself precisely into a cycli- 
cal pattern for equity prices and interest rates, with a phase shift in the 
path of interest rates relative to equity prices. 
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We continue to assume that the population cycle  repeats itself every 
forty years, or ten periods; that is, the number of agents entering the econ- 
omy  in period t +  10 is the same as the number of  agents entering in 
period t. Since the age composition in period t is the same as in period 
t  +  10,  there  are  now  ten  different  pyramids  A1,  ...,  A10, which  keep 
repeating  themselves.  For i =  1, ...,  10, let ni denote  the  size  of the cohort 
beginning  its  economic  life  in  pyramid  Ai. The  sequence  n1,  ...,  n1o can 
better approximate the progressive increase and decrease in live  births 
shown in figure 1. The choice of n1, ...,  n10,  which approximates the Great 
Depression and the baby-boom generations, is shown in figure 3: during 
the first five periods (twenty years) the small cohort enters, with n1 + n2  + 
n3  + n4  + n5  = 52, and in the next five periods the large cohort enters, with 
n6 + n7 + n8 + n9 + n1o  = 79.  The  cycle  then repeats  itself. 
To keep the structure of the economy comparable and consistent with 
the previous calibration, we assume that the wage schedule increases by 
the same percentage in each period from wl = 2/5 (the wage of the cohort 
aged 20-23)  to w8 =  1.5w' (the wage of the cohort aged 48-5 1), stays the 
same in the ninth period of work (w9 = w8), and decreases to w10  =  W7  in 
the last period of work. The forty-year work phase ends at age 60 (the 
agent enters the workplace at age 20),  and the agent receives  no wage 
income during the last five periods (twenty years) of life. Figure 3 shows 
the representative agent's  wage  income  during the working-life  phase 
(W',  ...,  WI(). 
Agents  trade the equity contract, which pays a constant dividend D 
each period, where D is 19 percent of the average total wage income over 
the ten pyramids (D = 12.74). Agents can also borrow and lend at the risk- 
less one-period interest rate rt, and since the bond and the equity contract 
are perfect substitutes, the sequence (q  b)t?  with qtb  =  1/(1 + rt) and the 
sequence  of equity  prices  (q  e)t?  must  satisfy 
=+r  1 
qeh 
qte  qth 
As in the three-period case, there is a stationary equilibrium: let ci = 
(cI,  ...,  c'5) denote the equilibrium consumption stream, during the fifteen 
periods of  (economically  active)  life,  of  the representative agent of  a 
cohort entering the economy  in pyramid Ai, and let  (qib  qe)  denote the 
equilibrium prices of the securities in pyramid Ai. Using k for the index of John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  271 
Figure 3. Simulated  Live Births and Lifetime  Wages in Model with 
Four-Year  Cohorts 
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Source: Authors'  model described  in the text. 
age (an agent in the kth period of economic activity is called an agent of 
"age"  k; for example, an agent of "age" 2 is between 24 and 27 years old), 
the  consumption  stream ci must  maximize  Xk=  u(CI  )  with u(c) = 
cl'/(l  -  oc),  subject to the budget constraint 
(16)  cI-  wI +qi(c2  -  w2)+  qiqi+l  qi+4(cI5  -  w5)  =  0, 
where, to simplify,  qib =  qi,  and all indices are taken modulo  10. Let Ak 
denote the number of agents of age k in pyramid Ai. Since these agents 272  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
entered the economy k -  1 periods earlier, their number is  ni-k+,  where 
again the indices are taken modulo  10. The equilibrium prices must be 
such that in each pyramid Ai markets clear, that is, 
15 
E  A(ik+  _Wk)  =D,  i=  1, ...,9  to. 
k=1 
The equilibrium interest rates and equity prices for the case cX  = 4 are 
shown in the top two panels of figure 4 as functions of the index i of the 
population pyramid Ai, as it runs through two  cycles.  The third panel 
shows a convenient index of the age composition of pyramid Ai reflecting 
the number of middle-aged relative to young agents: for pyramid Ai we 
take the ratio MYi  to be defined by 
A6i  +  A'i0  M  Yj  =  --  i  i  =1,  ...,9109 
Ai  +  ..i+ 
that is, the ratio of the number of agents aged 40-59  to the number of 
agents aged 20-39. 
It is remarkable that the price q, of equity is exactly in phase with a 
simple summary statistic of the age pyramid-the  MYi  ratio-despite  the 
fact that agents at the different phases of  their youth, middle age, and 
retirement have different levels  of  income  and different propensities to 
save. On the other hand, as figure 4 shows, in equilibrium the short-term 
interest rate is out of phase with the cycle  of equity prices and the MY 
ratio. The interest rate, which coincides with the rate of return on equity, 
is the sum of the dividend yield and the capital gain yield. The dividend 
yield is inversely proportional to the equity price and thus co-moves neg- 
atively with it. However,  the capital gain yield  depends on the rate of 
change of the equity price, and, because of the cyclical pattern  of the birth 
rate, this rate of change is maximal in the middle of the ascending phase 
of the equity prices and minimal in the middle of the descending phase: 
because of these capital gain terms, the turning points in the interest rate 
occur in the middle of the ascending and descending phases of the equity 
prices.  Short-term interest rates begin  to  increase before  equity prices 
have bottomed out, and they begin to decrease before equity prices have 
peaked. This synchronous behavior of equity prices and nonsynchronous 
behavior of rates of return with the MY ratio may help to explain one of 
the empirical findings reported by  Poterba: although certain summary John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  273 
Figure 4.  Simulated  Interest Rates, Equity Price, and MY Ratio in Model with 
Four-Year  Cohorts 
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a. One-period  interest  rate. 
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demographic statistics (similar to the MY ratio) correlate relatively well 
with the level of equity prices, they have essentially no significant corre- 
lation with rates of return on equity.32 
Figure 4 also shows the behavior of the long-term (real) interest rate, 
defined as the interest rate on the twenty-year (five-period) bond, namely, 
the geometric mean of the short-term  rates of return five periods into the 
future. The long-term interest rate is in (reverse) phase with the equity 
prices and the MY ratio. Thus the result of the model with three-period- 
lived agents-low  interest rates associated with high equity prices, and 
conversely-holds  true for the long-term real interest rate, which unfortu- 
nately is difficult to obtain from the data. The model also implies a chang- 
ing term structure of (real) interest rates, with the long-term rate below 
the short-term  rate on the ascending phase of equity prices and above it on 
the descending phase. 
Introducing  Business  Cycle Shocks 
If the real S&P 500 index is used as an approximate proxy for the level 
of stock prices, then the trough-to-peak variations observed over the past 
fifty years are more than twice those predicted by the simple demographic 
model presented in the previous sections (see figure 6). Demography can- 
not explain  everything,  nor should it.  The  long-term trends in  equity 
prices over this period coincided not only with demographic trends but 
also with runs of luck: the  1970s and early 1980s saw mainly negative 
shocks (oil shortages, bursts of high inflation followed by restrictive mon- 
etary policy, leading to unemployment and low productivity), whereas the 
1990s were characterized by aggregate shocks that were mainly positive 
(low inflation and energy prices, rapid technological progress resulting in 
low  unemployment and high productivity). We  thus add to the demo- 
graphic model of the previous section the possibility of random shocks to 
income, to study the combined effect of demographic and business cycle 
fluctuations for asset prices. 
Once  uncertainty is  introduced, risky  equity  and the  riskless  bond 
cease to be perfect substitutes. Equity must earn a risk premium relative 
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to the bond to induce agents to hold it, and the model permits us to study 
the effect of the changing demographic structure  on the risk premium. 
The certainty model of the previous section showed that the qualitative 
results of the simplest model, with three-period-lived agents, exogenous 
dividends, and no bequests, are robust to the introduction  of more-realistic 
features. We thus revert to this simplest model, adding the possibility of 
random wages and dividends, to study the combined effect for asset prices 
of demographic and business cycle fluctuations. 
Risk Structure 
We model the risk structure  of the economy by assuming that the wage 
and the dividends on equity are subject to shocks. We use a highly simpli- 
fied structure, assuming that at each date there are four possible states of 
nature (shocks): sl, high wages, high dividends; S2, high wages, low divi- 
dends; s3, low wages, high dividends; and s4, low wages, low dividends. 
Given the nature of the risks and the very extended length of time repre- 
sented by a period (twenty years), we have chosen not to invoke a Markov 
structure,  but rather  to assume that the shocks are independent and identi- 
cally distributed (i.i.d.). To reflect the fact that aggregate income and div- 
idends are positively  correlated, we assume that s, and s4 are more likely 
(probability 0.4 each) than S2 and s3 (probability 0.1 each). This gives rise 
to a correlation coefficient between dividends and wages of 0.6. 
Figure 2 shows that the maximum variability of the real annual wage 
income  of  the  45-54  cohort  is  about 4  percent: in  the  recession  of 
1990-91  the mean wage (in 1999 dollars) of this cohort fell from $65,000 
to $60,000,  a variability of (2.5/62.5)  = 0.04; the variability of the wage 
income of the 25-34  cohort is somewhat lower. To take into account that 
some  periods,  such  as  1970-83,  experienced  a  sequence  of  negative 
shocks, in the calibration we increase the coefficient of variation of the 
wage income of the middle-aged to 20 percent and that of the young to 
15 percent. Since the fluctuations of real (generalized) dividends are of 
the same order as those of wages,  we take a coefficient  of variation of 
19 percent for dividends. This leads to a coefficient of variation of about 
16  percent  for  aggregate  income.  In  short, we  assume  four  possible 
shocks with probabilities (0.4, 0.1, 0.1, 0.4), and wage income and divi- 
dends across the four states given by wY  = (2.3, 2.3,  1.7, 1.7), wm  = (3.6, 
3.6, 2.4, 2.4), and D = (74, 50, 74, 50). 276  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
Equilibrium 
Since the financial markets in the model are incomplete-each  date- 
event is followed  by four possible  income-dividend  shocks, and agents 
can trade only two securities (equity and the bond)-the  equilibrium can- 
not be solved, as in the previous section, in terms of the consumption vari- 
ables with a single present-value budget constraint for each agent. We 
need to explicitly  introduce the asset trades, portfolio optimization, and 
market-clearing  asset  prices.  Let  zt =  (Zty,  Ztm)  =  (Zy,tt Zye  t  z  ) denote the 
lifetime portfolio of an agent born at date t, namely, the holdings of the 
bond and equity zy = (z,y, zyet)  in youth and zm  = (Zmt  zmt) in middle age. 
Let c =  (cy, cm, c,r)  denote the agent's lifetime consumption in youth, mid- 
dle age, and retirement. Both zt and ct are stochastic, depending on the 
past history of shocks and on the shocks to wages and dividends during 
the agent's lifetime. The agent's consumption and portfolio holdings must 
satisfy the agent's budget constraints in each state, given by 
(17)  cY = wY  _ qz y 
t  wt+1  +  +1zt  qt+-  t 
Cr =  Y+zt,M  Ct  Vt+2  Zt 
where qt =  (qb, qe) denotes the vector of bond and equity prices at date t, 
and V,4 =  [1, Dt,  + qe1] denotes the payoffs of the bond and equity at date 
t + 1. An equilibrium on the bond and equity markets is then a sequence 
(zt, qt)t>0 of portfolios and prices such that the representative agent born at 
date t maximizes  lifetime  expected utility in equation 1, subject to the 
budget equations 17, and such that the bond and equity markets clear at 
each date t > 0 for each state 




eNzt  +enz,-,  =  1  Lnzy +  Nzm,,  =  1 
Our objective is to study how the alternating  cohort sizes of young and 
middle-aged influence the equilibrium on the financial markets. In view 
of  the  alternating cohort  structure and the  assumption that the  wage 
income and dividends are i.i.d., it is natural to look for a stationary equi- 
librium of the economy: in appendix B we define such an equilibrium and 
explain how it can be calculated. John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  277 
Calibration Results 
To study the properties of the equilibrium trajectories, we consider an 
economy with cohort sizes (N, n) =  (79, 52) and risk aversion parameter 
oc  = 4. The characteristics of equity prices and interest rates on equilib- 
rium trajectories are shown in table 4, and the characteristics of the con- 
sumption and portfolio strategies in table 5. A less detailed description is 
given  in appendix table Cl  for an economy  with a smaller variation in 
cohort sizes  (N, n) = (79, 69), calibrated to the sizes of the cohorts born 
over the periods 1945-64  and 1965-84,  for three different parameters of 
risk aversion (o = 2, 4, 6). 
As explained in appendix B, in order to find a Markov equilibrium, an 
endogenous  state variable-the  portfolio  income  that the middle-aged 
bring over from their youth-needs  to be added to the exogenous  state 
(k, s),  where k is the population pyramid state (k =  1, 2, depending on 
whether the period is  even  or odd),  and s  is  one  of  the four income- 
dividend shocks. Along every path, each pyramid-shock state (k, s) will 
occur infinitely often: in table 4 the standard  deviations of the prices (the 
numbers in parentheses) about their means (the numbers not in parenthe- 
ses) are given for each pyramid-shock state (k, s), averaged over all paths. 
An interesting feature of the equilibrium trajectories is that the standard 
deviations are very small, meaning that prices essentially depend only on 
the exogenous state (k, s). Thus the average values of the equity price (qe) 
and of the interest rate (ran)  in the different states (k, s) give a rather  pre- 
cise description of the prices on the equilibrium trajectories. Table 4 also 
shows the price-dividend ratio for each state, which we have divided by 2 
to make it comparable with the more familiar PE ratio, commonly used 
for evaluating the level of prices on the stock market. 
A new variable that enters when uncertainty is introduced is the equity 
premium, namely, the amount by  which  the expected return on equity 
exceeds  the return on bonds. The (annualized) equity premium is calcu- 
lated on a trajectory as 
rpan  =  average(rean  -  ran), 
where 
1/20 
ze,  +  Dt 
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is the (annualized) ex post rate of return on equity at date t. The ex ante 
equity premium is thus defined as the mean ex post equity premium and is 
given in table 4. The high variance of the ex post equity premium, even 
for a given pyramid-shock state (k, s), is natural, since the realized equity 
premium is large when a favorable state follows state s, and is small when 
an unfavorable state follows  state s. 
As is well known, the ex ante risk premia predicted by standard  ratio- 
nal expectations models are significantly smaller than those obtained ex 
post from the data, at least for the United States. Several approaches have 
been proposed to obtain models with larger risk premia. One is to take 
into account the fact that agents face individual risks, which make their 
consumption  significantly  more variable than aggregate consumption. 
We cannot take into account individual risks without unduly complicat- 
ing the model; to compensate, we have been generous in the calibration 
with the aggregate risk. Other solutions involve  entering as constraints 
some observed deviations of the behavior of agents from that predicted 
by the model. One prediction of the model is that agents make use of all 
the available instruments to redistribute income  and share risks. How- 
ever, even though the proportion of U.S. households investing in the stock 
market has  increased  significantly  over  the  last  fifty  years,33 it  still 
remains less than 50 percent. To take this into account, we solve for the 
equilibrium under the restriction that 50  percent of  the  agents in  any 
cohort do not trade on the equity market and restrict their financial trans- 
actions to the bond market (case B in tables 4 and 5). 
An alternative approach,  recently proposed by Constantinides, Donald- 
son, and Mehra, is to impose a borrowing constraint on the young:34  as 
shown in table 5, without such a constraint, the young typically borrow 
and use  much of  the proceeds  to  invest  in the equity market, to take 
advantage of  the equity premium. As  Constantinides, Donaldson,  and 
Mehra argue, this is not especially realistic. Although young agents can 
and do borrow significantly to buy houses  (which  serve as collateral), 
they do not typically borrow to invest in the stock market. The simplest 
way  of  preventing the  young  from taking leveraged  positions  on  the 
equity market is to impose a borrowing constraint. Such a constraint on 
33. Vissing-Jorgenson  (2000) estimates  the participation  rate in the stock market  at 
around  6 percent  in the early 1950s and  around  40 percent  in 1995. 
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the  young  decreases  the  demand for  the  risky  security  and tends  to 
increase the risk premium. However, in the simple model that we study, 
preventing every young  agent from borrowing closes  the bond market, 
and the interest rate is no longer well defined. To avoid this, while study- 
ing the effect on prices of reducing the demand for equity by the young, 
we solve for the equilibrium assuming that 90 percent of the young face 
borrowing constraints and the remaining  10 percent are unconstrained 
(case C in tables 4 and 5). In addition to the intrinsic interest and poten- 
tially greater realism of these two cases with restricted participation, they 
are also useful for checking the robustness of the results predicted by the 
standard model (case A in tables 4 and 5) to different assumptions about 
market participation. 
Cyclical Fluctuations of Security Prices 
The general principle that underlies the certainty model-namely,  that 
aggregate demand for saving is high in even periods when there is a large 
middle-aged and a small young cohort, whereas it is low in odd periods 
where there is  a small middle-aged  and a large young  cohort-carries 
over to the economy  with uncertainty. In an economy  with both demo- 
graphic and business cycle shocks, the stochastic sequence of equilibrium 
security prices (q[, q')  co-moves  with the MY ratio, being higher than 
average when the MY ratio is high and lower than average when it is low. 
Thus  long-run  fluctuations in  demographic structure lead  to  long-run 
cyclical fluctuations in security prices over time. The order of magnitude 
of the demographic effect is indicated in table 4 by the ratio of the average 
prices in the two pyramid states, and this is approximately the same as in 
the certainty model. 
Note  that the average interest rate is  high in odd periods, in which 
equity prices are low  and rising, and low in even periods, in which the 
equity prices are high and falling. It is precisely this simultaneous adjust- 
ment of interest rates and equity prices that prevents arbitrage  opportuni- 
ties from arising. 
Since, for a given population structure,  an increase in income increases 
the demand for saving,  equity prices covary positively  with  aggregate 
income.  Thus adding shocks to income  opens the possibility  of  greater 
variations in equity prices: the greatest increase occurs when the economy 
moves  from (1,  S4)  to (2, s,),  namely, from a period with a large young 284  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
cohort  and  negative  income shocks to a period  with a large  middle-aged 
cohort  and  favorable  shocks.  The ratio  of these prices is given in table 4 
by the peak-to-trough  ratio, and its inverse, the trough-to-peak  ratio, 
where  we see that  values  of 6 or 7 are  attained. 
Equity Premium 
The striking  feature  of the risk  premium  in the equilibria  that  we com- 
pute is that  it is larger  in pyramid  A1  than  in pyramid  A2.  At their  initial 
endowment,  the risk aversion  of young agents  is smaller  than  that  of the 
middle-aged:  they  have  the  prospect  of income  in middle  age, whereas  the 
middle-aged  have no income  in retirement  to help smooth  the risk  associ- 
ated  with  buying  a risky  security.  As a result,  the young  hold a higher  per- 
centage  of stock  in their  portfolio  and  actually  borrow  to hold equity.  One 
might  have thought  that  the equilibrium  risk  premium  would  therefore  be 
smaller  in pyramid  A1,  where  there  are  many  young  and  few middle-aged. 
Indeed,  this is the standard  prediction  in the literature. 
There  are two reasons  why we get the opposite  conclusion.  First,  the 
risks are not the same. Agents investing in pyramid  A, face a more 
risky-if  more favorable-market than agents investing in pyramid  A2, 
because  the return  Dt+?  + Q,1 depends  more  on the capital  value term  Q,t+ 
when  the  price-dividend  ratio  is expected  to be high, and  more  on the div- 
idend  Dt+,  when  the price-dividend  ratio  is expected  to be low. Dividends 
are  less variable  than  capital  values (in table  4 the coefficient  of variation 
of equity  prices  is always  more  than  40 percent,  whereas  the coefficient  of 
variation  of dividends  is 19 percent),  and so the return  on equity  is more 
variable  for agents investing in odd periods and expecting  high equity 
prices  next period  than  for those investing  in even periods  and  expecting 
low prices.  This can be seen from  the standard  deviation  of the risk pre- 
mium  in table  4, which  is essentially  the same  as the standard  deviation  of 
the rate of return,  and is higher  in pyramid  A, than in pyramid  A2.  The 
increase  in risk from another  dollar  of equity  is thus  higher  for the small 
generation  of middle-aged  than  for the large  generation  of middle-aged. 
Second, agents become more averse to additional  risk as their con- 
sumption becomes riskier. The middle-aged are buyers of equity in 
every generation.  Their risk aversion on the margin depends on how 
much  risk they face in old age. The variability  of consumption  of the old John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  285 
agents in large generations is smaller than that of the old in small gener- 
ations, precisely  because their stock returns are less  variable. Thus the 
middle-aged in the large generations may face less risk and be more risk- 
tolerant than the middle-aged of the small generations. This is sure to be 
the case if the young are prevented from holding much stock, as they are 
in cases B and C. 
As can be seen from table 4, restricting the participation on the equity 
market to 50 percent of the agents (case B) is the most effective  way of 
increasing the risk premium, because  the risk of  the equity is  divided 
among a smaller number of agents.35  Roughly speaking, the agents who 
are trading on the equity market (the unconstrained agents in table 5) hold 
twice  as much equity as their counterparts in case A and expose  them- 
selves  to more than twice the volatility of consumption. As a result, the 
equilibrium risk aversion is higher. Since the risk of equity is of the same 
order of magnitude, the risk premium is larger. 
The last case, where most young (90 percent) cannot borrow, is per- 
haps more realistic in terms of portfolio behavior, although the borrow- 
ing constraint is too extreme, since it is not uncommon for a young agent 
to borrow to buy a house while at the same time investing a fraction of 
wage income in equity in a retirement account, but it is less effective  at 
increasing the risk premium than case B. There are two reasons for this: 
The first is that the risk of equity decreases-because  of the reduced par- 
ticipation  of  the  young  on  the  equity  market, the  variability  of  their 
income  impinges  less  on the market, reducing the variability of equity 
prices. The second is that this reduced risk is shared among more agents 
than in case B. 
The Favored Cohort Effect 
As in the simple deterministic model, the long-run cyclical fluctuations 
in the demographic structure imply that agents in small cohorts receive 
more-favorable equilibrium lifetime consumption streams than do agents 
in large cohorts. The lifetime equilibrium consumption streams of agents 
35.  This is consistent with the findings of Heaton and Lucas (2000), who explore, in an 
overlapping-generations model with two-period-lived  agents, the idea of using restricted 
participation as a way of increasing the equity premium. However, in our model participa- 
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born  into  the small  and  large  cohorts  are  shown  in table  6 (they  have been 
multiplied  by 10,000  to make  the comparison  of the consumption  streams 
more  intuitive).  Even though  all agents  begin with the same average  life- 
time wage income (20,000 as young, 30,000 in middle age, 0 in retire- 
ment),  the average  lifetime consumption  stream  of an agent  born  into a 
small  cohort  is significantly  greater  than  that  of an agent  in a large  cohort. 
This difference  arises  from  the cyclical fluctuations  in the security  prices: 
the two columns  to the right  of the average  consumption  stream  show the 
average  prices  (the equity  price  and  the interest  rate)  that  the correspond- 
ing agent  faces during  his or her  lifetime,  and  the last entry  in the interest 
rate  column  gives the expected  utility  (averaged  over  the possible  income 
shocks  when  young)  of an agent  born  into a large  or a small  cohort.  In the 
constrained-participation  cases, Uc and  uu  denote  the utility of the con- 
strained  and  the unconstrained  agents,  respectively.36 
Case B in table  6 shows the loss to their  average  lifetime  consumption 
stream  incurred  by agents who are assumed  not to participate  on the 
equity  market-as usual,  the loss incurred  by boomers  is greater  than  that 
for Xers. Although  there  is a gain in terms  of reduced  variability  of con- 
sumption,  the loss to average  consumption  is substantial,  especially in 
middle  age and  retirement.  As a result,  agents  who for whatever  reason- 
ignorance  or fear-do  not participate  on the stock  market  do so at consid- 
erable  cost to their  lifetime  consumption  and  utility. 
The cost of nonparticipation  is less marked  in case C, where agents 
face borrowing  constraints  in youth. Constrained  Xers lose only when 
they  are  young,  because  they  cannot  take  advantage  of the favorable  terms 
for borrowing,  whereas  constrained  baby-boomers  lose throughout  their 
life, since they  cannot  exploit  the favorable  terms  for saving  in youth,  giv- 
ing them less wealth  in middle  age and hence less consumption  in both 
middle  age and  retirement. 
Other  authors,  in particular  Richard  Easterlin,37  have pointed  out that 
the  baby-boomers,  being a large  generation,  face more  competition  on the 
labor  market  and  thus  should  be expected  to receive  lower  wages than  the 
36.  It can be shown that the extent to which the small cohort is favored depends on the 
magnitude of the fluctuations in security prices: the greater the difference in cohort sizes, 
the greater the degree  of  relative risk aversion; or the greater the variability of  agents' 
endowment  streams, the  greater the  fluctuations in  security prices,  and the  greater the 
extent to which capital markets favor the small cohort. 
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small  generation that preceded them: this  labor market cohort effect, 
which has been somewhat controversial,38  is absent from our model, since 
we  assume  that agents  have  the  same  lifetime  wage  profile  in  both 
cohorts. Our model  shows,  however,  that large cohorts face  a second 
curse from the financial markets: by being so numerous, they drive the 
terms of trade against themselves, favoring the small cohorts on the other 
side of the market that follow or precede them. 
Comparing  Calibration  with Observations 
The  model  studied  in  the  previous  sections  predicts  relationships 
between demographic variables and asset prices. In this section we ana- 
lyze in a stylized way whether the predictions of the model are consistent 
with data over the last century for the United States. The key demographic 
hypothesis of the model is that the birth rate is cyclical,  with a period of 
forty years, which is  a simplification of  the observed birth rate in the 
United  States during the twentieth century. As  we  have  seen,  leaving 
aside output shocks, the cyclical birth rate implies that equilibrium prices 
and quantities can be expressed as a function of a simple statistic of the 
population pyramid: the MY ratio. This ratio (shown in figure 5) is taken 
as the ratio of the size of the cohort aged 40-49  to the size of the cohort 
aged 20-29  for the U.S. population.39  Note that the use of the MY ratio as 
a summary statistic of the population pyramid is justified only in the con- 
text of an intertemporal equilibrium of an economy with a cyclical birth 
rate: the MY ratio indicates where in the pyramid cycle  the economy is 
located  at a given  time, but it does  not imply  that the young  and the 
middle-aged cohorts that serve to define the ratio are the only  cohorts 
whose trade influences the equilibrium-all  cohorts trade, and all influ- 
ence the equilibrium outcome.40  The very weak cyclical movement in the 
38.  Welch (1979) found evidence that wages depend on cohort sizes for the period pre- 
ceding  1980; for the period after 1980, as Macunovich (2002)  has shown, additional vari- 
ables are needed to explain the movements in wages. 
39.  The MY ratio obtained by using the size of the cohort aged 40-59  relative to that of 
the cohort aged 20-39  is approximately the same as the ratio we have chosen, with a phase 
shift (advance) of four years. The ratio chosen is slightly better related to the asset price 
data, but both indices give very similar results. 
40.  Empirical studies that have analyzed the influence of demography on asset markets 
without an equilibrium model  have  considered  either several  summary statistics  of  the John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  289 
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Source:  Historical  Statistics  of the  United  States,  series  A33-35,  and Bureau  of  the Census  data. 
a.  Ratio  of the  cohort  aged  40-49  to the cohort  aged  20-29. 
b.  Data  from  2001  onward  are projections. 
MY ratio until 1945 indicates that there was only a weak cyclical compo- 
nent in the birth rate (and the immigration rate) at the end of the nine- 
teenth and the beginning  of  the twentieth century: thus for the period 
1910-45  we should expect to see a less  systematic relationship between 
asset prices and the MY ratio than for the period 1945-2002. 
Equity Prices 
Using the real Standard  and Poor's index expressed in dollars of 2000 
as the index of equity prices (figure 6), consider in broad outline the joint 
behavior of the MY ratio and equity prices.4' Up to the late 1940s there 
population  pyramid  (Poterba,  2001; Ang and  Maddaloni,  forthcoming)  or the influence  of 
all age cohorts  on the financial  variables  (Poterba,  2001; Macunovich,  2002). 
41. We are grateful  to Robert  Shiller  for making  the data  set for the S&P  index avail- 
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Figure 6. Real Standard  and Poor's Index of Common  Stock Prices, 1910-2002a 
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Source: Data  from Robert  Shiller's website: www.econ.yale.edu/-shiller. 
a. Base year  for price index is 2000. 
were  no  significant variations in  the  MY  ratio, and this  corresponds 
roughly with the lack of systematic long-run movement in the S&P index 
around its trend over this period. To be sure, there were large ten-year 
fluctuations up to the 1940s-for  example, the ten-year boom of the Roar- 
ing Twenties-but  we think of these as shorter-run  business cycle fluctu- 
ations. Starting in the late 1940s and continuing all through the 1950s and 
early 1960s, the ratio of middle-aged to young agents was rising: the mid- 
dle-aged agents had been born at the turn of the century, a period of rela- 
tively high birth rates (see figure 1) and immigration, and the young were 
the small generation born during the Great Depression and World War II. 
During this same period, equity prices were steadily rising. Stock market 
prices declined in real terms at the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s, 
during which the MY ratio also declined  significantly: the small Great 
Depression generation became middle-aged, while the large generation of 
baby-boomers entered their active life.  In the early 1980s equity prices John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  291 
began their remarkable  ascent to their peak in 2000, and it was during this 
period that the plentiful baby-boomers moved into middle age, while the 
small cohort of Xers, born in the 1970s, entered their economic life, cre- 
ating the equally dramatic surge in the MY ratio. 
The price-earnings ratio is a normalized measure of the level of equity 
prices, which has the advantage of factoring out growth and is thus more 
directly comparable with the results of our model. As figure 7 shows, the 
PE ratio follows  roughly the  same pattern as the real S&P index  and 
corresponds well with the long-run fluctuations in the MY ratio. The PE 
ratio increases from a low  of 7 in 1949 to around 20 in the 1960s, then 
decreases  in  the  1970s  and  early  1980s  to  around 8,  after which  it 
increases to around 30 in 2000. These numbers correspond well with the 
predictions of  tables 4  and C1  (with oc = 4): PE ratios (or half price- 
dividend ratios in the tables) vary between 7 and 8 in the bad stateS4 of 
pyramid A1  and between 25 and 0 in the good state s, of pyramid A2. 
Table 7 shows the results of regressing the PE ratio on the MY cohort 
ratio, 
PEt =c+3MYt+  ,, 
for different time periods. Since the series are slow moving and there is a 
danger of finding spurious correlations, we report the t statistics of the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller  unit-root test on the residuals of  the regres- 
sion.42 The regression tends to  support the hypothesis  of  a systematic 
relationship between the PE ratio and the MY ratio: the regression coef- 
ficients are significant and stable, and the probability of a unit root in the 
residuals is low on the largest sample, that for 1910-2002.43 
Rates of Return 
A defect of the stochastic model with twenty-year time periods is that 
it cannot give insight into short-run  rates of return.  We were able to study 
42. All the augmented  Dickey-Fuller  t statistics  of residuals  reported  in this section  are 
derived  from  the regression  of the differenced  residual  on the residual  without  a constant 
and  with one lagged  variable.  A critical  value  smaller  than  -3.39 leads  to a rejection  of the 
null hypothesis  of a unit  root  in the residuals  at the 99 percent  confidence  level. The  critical 
levels for the 97.5 percent  and 95 percent  confidence  levels are  -3.05 and  -2.76, respec- 
tively (Phillips  and  Ouliaris,  1990). 
43. These  results  are  consistent  with those  of Poterba  (2001, table  9), who finds  a sig- 
nificant  relationship  between  the price-dividend  ratio  and  demographic  variables. 292  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
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Source: Historical Statistics  of the United  States, series A33-35, Bureau  of the Census  data,  and  data  from  Robert  Shiller's web- 
site: www.econ.yale.edu/-shiller. 
a. Calculated  by dividing the monthly  S&P index by an average  of earnings  for the past twelve months  and annualizing. 
short-run  rates of return  only in the deterministic model, in which the rate 
of return on equity coincides  with the interest rate. There we found that 
the rate of return  (and hence the interest rate) is not synchronized with the 
MY ratio, because it is importantly influenced by capital gains or losses, 
which depend on the change in the equity price and hence on the change 
(and not the level)  of the MY ratio. This suggests studying how annual 
Table 7.  Results of Regressions  of PE Ratio on MY Ratioa 
Sample  period 
Coefficient  or test statistic  1910-2002  1945-2002  1965-2002 
Constant  -3.5  -5.5  -7.1 
(3.2)  (3.7)  (2.6) 
f3  23.5  25.4  29.7 
(4.4)  (4.7)  (3.3) 
R  2  0.48  0.55  0.78 
ADF t statistic  -4.1  -2.8  -4.8 
Source: Authors'  regressions. 
a. Newey-West standard  errors  (Newey and  West, 1987) are in parentheses. John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  293 
Table 8. Results of Regressing  Rates of Return or Short-Term  Interest Rates 
on Differenced  MY Ratioa, 
Dependent  variable 
Real rate of return 
on S&P  500 index  Real short-term  interest  rate 
Sample  period  Constant  f  R2  Constant  f  R2 
1910-2002  6.73  206  0.07  0.76  20.23  0.01 
(1.9)  (43)  (0.7)  (12.8) 
1945-2002  7.42  197  0.14  0.53  12.6  0.02 
(1.6)  (41)  (0.6)  (11.4) 
1965-2002  5.9  186  0.16  1.28  22.8  0.16 
(2.0)  (40)  (0.5)  (10.6) 
Source: Authors' regressions. 
a.  Newey-West standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
interest rates and rates of return  on equity covary with the differenced MY 
ratio. The results of the regression 
Xt = c+  D(MY)t  +  t 
are shown in table 8 for different time periods, where Xt is either the rate 
of return  on the S&P index or the real short-term  interest rate, and D(MY), 
The results for the rate of return on equity are as expected: the rate of 
return is  much more variable than the change in the MY  ratio and is 
clearly affected by other shocks (to output). Nevertheless,  demographic 
changes  account for  14 percent of  the variability of  the rate of  return 
between 1945 and 2002, which is nonnegligible. Figure 8 shows the rela- 
tionship: rates of return  tend to be higher in the late 1940s and 1950s and 
in the mid-1980s  and the 1990s, when the MY ratio was increasing, and 
lower than average in the late 1960s and 1970s, when the MY ratio was 
decreasing. 
On the other hand, the relationship between the short-term  interest rate 
and the change in the MY ratio is weaker than expected during the period 
1945-2002.  The regression has to be restricted to 1965-2002  to obtain a 
significant relationship between the interest rate and the differenced MY 
ratio: indeed, as figure 9  shows,  during this period the behavior of the 
interest rate is roughly compatible with the equilibrium behavior shown in 
figure 4: real interest rates declined after 1965 and were very low in the 294  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
Figure 8. Real Rate of Return  on Standard  and Poor's Index and Change  in MY 
Ratio, 1910-2002 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  from  Standard  and Poor's, and  Historicail  Statistics  of the Uniited  States and  Bureau  of the Census 
data. 
mid-1970s,  when  the MY  ratio and real equity prices  were  declining 
rapidly. The turn in interest rates occurred in  1980, before the turn in 
equity prices, and interest rates were high in the early 1980s at the begin- 
ning of the rise in stock prices. They stayed relatively high until 2000, 
with  a  small  intermission before  and during the  fall  in  equity  prices 
accompanying the Gulf War recession.  The period  1945-65  does  not, 
however, fit the predictions of the model: the return  on equity was consis- 
tently high during the bull market of the 1950s and early 1960s, while the 
interest rate was low,  especially  at the beginning of the rise in the late 
1940s and early 1950s; this is difficult to reconcile with rational expecta- 
tions.  One hypothesis  is  that many investors,  scared by  the enormous 
losses  incurred on the stock market during the Great Depression, fled to 
the relative safety of the bond market, leading to a period of low interest 
rates.  As  we  have  seen,  restricted participation in  the  equity  market 
decreases interest rates. John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  295 
Figure 9. Real Short-Term  Interest Rate and Change  in MY Ratio, 1910-2002 
Percent  a year 
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Source: Authors' calculations from Economic Report of the President, various years, and Historical Statistics of the United 
States. 
a.  Series obtained  by splicing the three-month  Treasury  bill rate series for the period 1939-2002 with the short-term  commer- 
cial paper  rate  for the period 1910-38, with the latter  decreased  by 0.55 percent,  the average  premium  on commercial  paper  for the 
period when both series are available. 
The Equity Premium 
In the different equilibria that we  calculated, real interest rates were 
between -5  percent and 9 percent. Although, as seen from figure 9, this 
interval is not exceptional by historical standards-before  the 1950s the 
real interest rate fluctuated between -12  percent and 18 percent-the  fluc- 
tuations in interest rates in the postwar period, in which the significant 
demographic changes occurred, have been smaller, between -3  percent 
and 5 percent. Part of the reason is that the change of regime from a gold 
standard  to fiat money has increased the effectiveness  of monetary policy 
aimed at reducing the variability of inflation and stabilizing real interest 
rates. 
The smaller-than-predicted adjustment of interest rates to movements 
in equity prices implies that the high values of the risk premium are much 296  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
Figure 10. Equity Premium  and MY Ratio, 1910-2002 
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Source: Authors' calculations from Economic Report of the President, various years, and Historical Statistics of the United 
States, and Standard  and  Poor's data. 
a. Calculated  as the geometric mean of the rate of return  on the S&P twenty years forward  minus the geometric mean of the 
interest  rate over the period. The series is continued  after 1983, which is the last year for which twenty observations  forward  are 
available,  to 1993 by taking  the forward  geometric  means over the available  observations.  The rate  of return  on the S&P is calcu- 
lated as in figure 8. The short-term  interest  rate  is calculated  as in figure  9. 
higher than that predicted by the model. The equity premium in figure 10 
is  calculated by  taking the geometric mean rate of  return on the S&P 
twenty years forward at each date and subtracting the geometric mean of 
the short-term interest rate over the same period; this gives  the average 
equity premium that agents could have expected if they invested at this 
date with perfect foresight. The maximum occurred in the early to mid- 
1940s, reflecting the fact that the excess return  on equity was high during 
the  twenty  years  of  rising  prices  from  1945  to  1965.  The  minimum 
occurred around 1965, which means that the equity premium was small 
during the declining market of the 1970s and early 1980s. Then there is a 
local  maximum in  1980 arising from the high rate of  return on equity 
from the beginning of the 1980s up to 2000. 
The qualitative behavior of the equity premium fits the predictions of 
the model well: in equilibrium the excess return is higher on average for John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  297 
those agents who buy at low prices, when the MY ratio is low, than for 
those who buy at high equity prices and expect a low return,  when the MY 
ratio is high. The equilibrium results on the equity premium are driven by 
the fact that returns are more variable when prices go up than when they 
go down. This is only partly supported by the data: with yearly data there 
is no marked change in the variability of the S&P index on the ascending 
and descending phases.44  However, at the higher frequency of daily data, 
the market has been  substantially riskier in the recent ascending phase 
(1982-2000)  than it was in the preceding declining phase (1965-82):  on 
these time intervals the standard deviation of the daily rate of change in 
the price index went from 0.83 percent to 1.1 percent, and the number of 
days when prices changed by more than 2 percent rose from 121 to 207. 
The bull market of the  1950s,  on the other hand, did not exhibit more 
volatility than the ensuing bear market of the 1970s. 
Note that, given the small variability of the short-term  interest rate, the 
behavior of the average (geometric) excess return  twenty years forward is 
close  to that of the average (geometric) rate of return twenty years for- 
ward. This  long-term rate of  return on  equity thus exhibits  a cyclical 
behavior with a twenty-year phase shift from the MY ratio, which roughly 
fits the prediction of the deterministic and the stochastic models. 
International Evidence 
The three alternating twenty-year episodes of increasing and decreas- 
ing equity prices in the United States constitute a rather small sample for 
checking whether demographic forces were a significant causal element 
in these price changes. The experience of countries other than the United 
States may help to increase the number of  observations for testing the 
demographic hypothesis. This section studies whether there is a relation- 
ship between equity prices and demography for Germany, France, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom. 
The  model  that led  to  the tests  for the United  States rests on  two 
assumptions-a  cyclical  live  birth process and a closed  economy-that 
44. If we compute  for each  year  the standard  deviation  of the  rate  of return  on the S&P 
index during  the following twenty years, the most obvious  result  is that,  because of the 
Great  Depression,  the volatility  in the rate  of return  experienced  by investors  at the begin- 
ning  of the  century  was much  larger  than  that  experienced  after  World  War  II.  For  example, 
the standard  deviation of the twenty-year-forward  rate of return  was between 24 and 
28 percent  from 1914  to 1932,  whereas  since 1940  it has  varied  between  13 and 17 percent. 298  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
may not be appropriate  for other countries. The cyclical live birth process 
comes directly from the observation of the U.S. live birth process and  jus- 
tifies taking the MY ratio as a proxy for the composition of the popula- 
tion. Since the live births of the other countries just mentioned are less 
clearly cyclical, we study two proxies for the composition of the popula- 
tion: the MY ratio defined as for the United States, and the size  of the 
cohort aged 35-59,  which is a direct measure of the middle-aged group. 
We have assumed a closed economy in order to explain asset prices in 
the  United  States  by  the  country's  own  demographic  structure. This 
assumption seems  reasonable for  studying the past,  if  not the  future, 
behavior of the U.S.  stock market, since until recently U.S.  equity has 
been mostly owned by U.S. investors: up to 1975 foreigners held less than 
4 percent of U.S. equity, and, despite the increase during the 1980s, for- 
eigners still hold less than 11 percent.45  The home bias phenomenon has 
been documented for other countries, but the closed-economy  assumption 
may nevertheless be more appropriate for the United States and Japan, 
which have the two largest stock markets in the world, than for the three 
European markets, which seem to follow the U.S. market. 
Table 9 presents results of the regression 
RPt  =c?+  M,  +F, 
where RPt is the real stock price index of the country in question, and Mt 
is the demographic index: in the four left-hand columns  Mt  is the MY 
ratio for the cohort aged 40-49  to that aged 20-29,  and in the remaining 
columns Mt is the size of the cohort aged 35-59.  The regression is limited 
to the period 1950-2001,  since the population data, which come from the 
United Nations, are available only since 1950. 
The  results are mixed.  Germany shows  little  sign  of  a relationship 
between equity prices and demography:  the R2 is small, and the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller t statistic does not support  cointegration. For France the real 
stock index has a relatively significant relationship with the MY ratio, but 
no convincing relationship with the cohort aged 35-59,  and conversely the 
U.K. real stock index has no relationship with the MY ratio, but a rela- 
tively  strong relationship with the 35-59  cohort. All the results improve 
significantly when the regression is restricted to  1980-2001:  each of the 
45. Board  of Governors  of the  Federal  Reserve  System,  Flow of Funds  Accounts  of the 
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Figure 11. Real Nikkei  225 Stock Price Index and Japanese  MY Ratio, 1950-2050a 
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Source: Authors'  calculations  based on date from Global  Financial  Data, Inc., and  from the United Nations (2001). 
a. Data from 2001 onward  are projections. 
European countries had a baby boom after 1945, giving rise to a large and 
growing middle-aged cohort from 1980 to 2001, and each, like the United 
States, experienced a stock market  boom over this period. 
The most convincing evidence for the demographic hypothesis is pro- 
vided by Japan. The Japanese market does not seem to follow  the U.S. 
market: Japanese stock prices rose in the mid-1960s  and the 1970s and 
fell  during the 1990s, when the U.S.  market was booming. Japan's live 
birth process has some of the same cyclical  aspects as that in the United 
States, but with different dates for the peaks and troughs. As  figure 11 
shows,  the turning point of  the Nikkei  index coincided  almost exactly 
with the turning point of the MY ratio. 
Concluding  Remarks 
The model studied  in this paper  has combined  a demographic  structure 
tailored to the demographic experience of the United States during the last John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  301 
century with a life-cycle  behavior of  the representative agent for each 
generation. The calculation of equilibrium shows that fluctuating cohort 
sizes induce substantial changes in equity prices, resulting in predictable 
rates of return on equity: high price-earnings ratios are followed  on aver- 
age by low rates of return, and low price-earnings ratios by high rates of 
return. The changes in equity prices are accompanied by changes in rates 
of return and interest rates that are linked to the change in, rather than the 
level of, the MY ratio. The equilibrium also exhibits some predictability 
of excess returns. When tested against the data, the model does not do too 
badly at predicting equity prices and rates of return on the stock market. 
However, the predictions of interest rates and excess returns  are less satis- 
factory. On the whole, the fact that the turning points of stock prices and 
PE ratios are well synchronized with the demographic cycle, as measured 
by the MY ratio, seems to argue in favor of the demographic hypothesis. 
Contrary to  the conclusion  of  Poterba,46  given  the predicted future 
behavior of the MY ratio (figure 5), our model predicts a decline in the PE 
ratio in the U.S. equity market over the next twenty years; this conclusion 
is similar to that of John Campbell and Robert Shiller based on the histor- 
ical  mean reversion of  the PE ratio process.47 The predictions of  our 
model should, however, be interpreted with caution in view of the ongo- 
ing globalization of equity markets. This study has been based on national 
(mainly U.S.) data for equity markets and demography-a  restriction  jus- 
tified  by  the  strong and well-documented  home  bias  toward national 
equity issues.48 However, a financial market model placed in an interna- 
tional setting predicts that agents will diversify across the equity issues of 
other countries. This discrepancy between theory and observation tends to 
disappear with the decrease in transactions and informational costs  and 
the development of  financial markets,49  so that the future path of U.S. 
equity prices may well depend more on the joint demography of countries 
participating on the U.S. equity market than on U.S. demography alone. 
Most developed countries have similar demographic perspectives for the 
next thirty years, with a baby-boom generation going into retirement, low 
birth rates, and a lengthening of life expectancy-all  factors leading to a 
46.  Poterba (2001). 
47.  Campbell and Shiller (2001). 
48.  French and Poterba (1991); Tesar and Werner (1995). 
49.  Recent papers (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003; Ahmadi, 2003)  have documented 
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high elderly dependency ratio (the ratio of retired to working agents). The 
only real prospect for offsetting the effect of a small generation of middle- 
aged agents buying the equity of a large retired generation comes  from 
increased participation in the U.S. securities market by investors from the 
developing countries. 
APPENDIX  A 
Correcting for Immigration 
ANNUAL DATA  FOR  immigration  were  obtained  from the Historical  Statis- 
tics of the United States and from the Statistical Yearbook of the Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Service  (INS,  which  has  become  the  U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Service, USCIS).  From these data we find 
that immigrants into the United States numbered approximately 2.4 mil- 
lion  for  the  period  1925-44,  4.5  million  in  1945-64,  8.8  million  in 
1965-84,  and 16.8 million in 1985-2004.  The USCIS statistics indicate 
that, between  1994 and 1996, on average 21 percent of immigrants were 
below  age  15, 33.3  percent were aged  15-29,  26.3  percent were  aged 
30-44,  14.7 percent were aged 45-64,  and 4.7 percent were 65 and older. 
These age groups do not correspond exactly to the age cohorts that we 
consider; therefore we estimate the number of immigrants below age 20 at 
25 percent of the total, the number aged 20-39  at 50 percent, the number 
aged 40-59  at 20 percent, and the number 60 and over at 5 percent. We 
use the formulas 
Yt =  LBt-I +  Ct_n,  Mt  =  1? + Mt.. 
to correct the size of the cohorts, where Yt  and Mt denote the number of 
young and middle-aged at period t, respectively; LBt denotes the number 
of live births; and Cyi, Ytir,  and Mlif the numbers of immigrants who are 
children, young adults, and middle-aged, respectively. 
The  immigration-adjusted  number  of  young  (baby-boomers)  and 
middle-aged (Depression generation) for the period 1965-84  becomes 
Y65-84 = 79+  (0.25 x 4.6) + (0.5 x 8.8) = 85 
M65-84 = 52 + (0.25  x 2.4) + (0.5 x 4.6)  + (0.2  x 8.8)  = 57, John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  303 
with a ratio of 85/57 = 0.67 instead of 79/52 = 0.66 as adopted in the text 
of the paper. Similarly, for the period 1985-2004,  the corrected number 
of young (Xers) is Y8,54  = 79.6, and the corrected number of middle-aged 
(boomers) is M85 04  =  88.4, leading to a ratio of 88.4/79.6 = 1.11 instead of 
79/69 = 1.14 as adopted in the text. 
APPENDIX  B 
Markov  Equilibrium 
SINCE  AGENTS'  ECONOMIC lives span three periods, it can be shown that a 
Markov equilibrium that depends on the exogenous  states-the  pyramid 
and shock states-does  not exist. What is needed is an endogenous vari- 
able that summarizes the dependence of the equilibrium on the past-the 
income that the middle-aged agents inherit from their portfolio decision in 
their youth. Thus we study equilibria with a state space 6  = G x K x S, 
where G is a compact subset of 91?,  K = {  1, 21 is the set of pyramid states 
(indexed by k E {  1, 2}), and S = {s,  s2, s3, s4  } is the set of shock states: we 
let  , = (y, k, s) denote a typical element of the state space 6,  with y denot- 
ing the portfolio income inherited by the middle-aged agents from their 
youth. The pyramid state k determines the age pyramid Ak  =  (AY, A-, A). 
If k is the population state at date t, let k+ denote the pyramid state at 
period t +  1 and k- the pyramid state at t -  1. Since the pyramid states 
alternate, if k = 1 then k+  = k- = 2. The output shock s E S determines the 
incomes wy = (wy, s E S) and w-  = (w-,  s E S) of the young and middle- 
aged agents, respectively,  as well as the dividend D = (Ds, s E  S) on the 
equity contract. 
To find a Markov equilibrium, we note that the security prices only 
need to make the portfolio trades of the young and middle-aged agents 
compatible: the retired agents have no portfolio decision to make-they 
collect  the dividends and sell their equity holdings. Thus we  are led to 
study the portfolio problems of the young  and the middle-aged agents, 
with the latter inheriting the income y, and to look for security prices that 
clear the markets. This problem can be reduced to the study of a family of 
two-period portfolio problems in which middle-aged agents anticipate the 
consequences of their decisions for their retirement-they  need to antici- 
pate the next-period equity price  Qe  and young  agents anticipate the 304  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:2004 
portfolio  income  they  will  transfer  into  middle  age  (which  also  depends 
on Qe)  and the saving decision F that they will make in the next period to 
provide  income  for  their  retirement.  A  correct  expectations  equilibrium 
then has the property  that the agents'  expectations  are fulfilled  in the next 
period.  Given  that  an equilibrium  involves  both  current  and  anticipated 
variables,  we  introduce  the convention  that current variables  are denoted 
by  lowercase  letters  and anticipated  variables  are denoted  by  capitals.  A 
stationary  Markov  equilibrium  will  be  a function  P:  9  4  X  9I2  X  981 
with  cF = (z, q, Qe, F),  where  z = (zy,  zm)  =  (z,  zy,  z,  zm)  is the vector  of 
bond  and  equity  holdings  of  the  young  and  middle-aged  agents,  respec- 
tively,  q =  (qb,  qe)  is the vector  of  current prices  for the bond  and equity, 
Q= (Qe, s E S) is the vector of anticipated next-period equity prices, and 
F=  (Fs,  s  E  S)  is  the  vector  of  anticipated  next-period  savings  of  the 
young.  To  express  the condition  on correct  expectations,  we  need  the fol- 
lowing  notation:  if,  in  state  ,, young  agents  choose  a portfolio  zY(,)  and 
anticipate equity prices Qe(4),  then the income F(,)  = (Fs(),  s E  S) that 
they  anticipate  transferring  into  middle  age  is given  by 
RJ() = V(4)zy(4),  4 E  , 
where V(,)  =  [1, D +  Qe(4)],  1 =  (1,  ...,  1) E  914 denoting the sure payoff 
on  the bond,  and D  = (Ds,  s  E  S)  the random  dividend  on  equity.  We  let 
f(t)  denote  the  actual  savings  chosen  by  middle-aged  agents  when  the 
state is  ,; thus 
f(4)  =  q(4)z'  (  c)  -  E 
Definition.  A function  CD  = (z, q, Qe,  F):  _H  9 4  X  912  X  981  is a station- 
ary (Markov)  equilibrium  of  the economy  E(u,  w, D,  A) if,  V  , =  (y, k, s) 
c- 
(B1)  z(,)  =  arg max  {u(cY)  +  6Xps,u(CST)c  = 
S 
+  (E,)z- 
L, 
(Y 
S'es  Cm~  =W'i  + V(~)zy  -  F~ 
(B2)  z(,)  argmax  ,,,2  u(c(C)+  6Xp u(C;))  c  w  t  yq(j)z 
s'es  Cr =  V(()Z  J 
(B3)  ~AYkZY  (~) + An~Zm~(~  0,  AYkZy  (~) + AmkZm  (~)1 John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  305 
(B4)  Qe~  (4)  =qe(F  (E(  ,),  k+, s'),V  s' e S. 
F,,(4)=f(F,4)9k+9s-)9  Vs.'CS. 
B 1 and B2  are the conditions requiring maximizing behavior on the 
part of  young  and middle-aged  agents who  anticipate the equity prices 
Qe(4)  and, in the case  of  the young  agents, anticipate the saving F(,). 
Note that the vector of consumption Cm E 9I4, which a young agent antic- 
ipates for middle  age  (hence  the capital letter), must be  distinguished 
from cm(,)  E 91, which is the current  consumption of a middle-aged agent. 
B3 requires that the aggregate demands of the two cohorts for the bond 
and the equity contract clear the markets. B4 is the condition requiring 
that the agents' expectations be correct. In choosing their portfolio zY(,) in 
state  ,, young agents anticipate transferring the income T(,)  = V(4)zY(4) 
to the next period, where V(,)  is the anticipated payoff of the securities 
depending on Qe(4).  In order that Qe (4) be a correct expectation, it must 
coincide with the price qe(Fr,(4),  k+,  s'), which is realized in output state 
s'when middle-aged agents receive  the portfolio income y' = V  (E,)  and 
the pyramid state is k+;  in the same way the saving F, (e) that the young 
anticipate doing in their middle age must coincide with the actual saving 
of a middle-aged agent with asset income  '  =  ). 
For given anticipation functions 
(Qe  F):*  9  4  X94 
B1,  B2,  and B3  in the definition of a stationary equilibrium in the text, 
define a family  of  two-period equilibria indexed by  , =  (y, k, s)  E. 
Assuming uniqueness of the equilibria, let 
(Z(Qe,F)  (4)q  q(Qe,F)  (4)9  F(Qe  F)  (4)9  fQe,F)  () 
denote the equilibrium portfolios, prices, and anticipated income transfers 
by the young, and the actual savings of the middle-aged, for each 4  EE. 
Finding a recursive equilibrium amounts to finding functions (Qe, F) such 
that B4 is satisfied, that is, 
(B5)  [Q(4)][q(Qe,F)(  v(Qe,F)s  ()q  k,  ) 
S 
V s'  e  S,  V E = (y, k, s) E_ 
L  s'() 
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Assuming that the anticipation functions as well as the equilibrium func- 
tions are continuous, an equilibrium is a fixed point on the space of con- 
tinuous  functions  C(_,  9SU)  of the form  (Qe  F)  = N(Qe  F),  where  N(Qe, F) 
is defined by the right-hand side of equation B5. We look for an approxi- 
mate equilibrium in the space of piecewise  linear functions on G x K x S, 
calculating "as if'  xy  were a contraction. 
We begin by choosing an interval  G =  [y, y] and a grid Gm  = {g1, 
gm  } on this interval and then choose arbitrary  initial anticipation functions 
(Qe,O FO) on Gm  x K x S. By  solving  a sequence  of two-period  equilibrium 
problems, we can then compute the family of associated two-period equi- 
libria [zO(,), q0(,), T0(,), f0(,),  4  E  Gm  x K x S], possibly modifying the 
interval G so that Ps(,)  E G for all s and all 44  E  Gm  x K x S. 
Then by recursion we define for n > 1 the anticipation functions (Qen, 
Fn) by 
[FQn  (4)  =Lin  [qe,n-  (rs- (4)k+, s'))  VssES,  4=GmxKxS, 
where  (zn-1,  qn-l,  Fn-I fn-l)  is the  family  of  two-period  equilibria  associ- 
ated with  (Qen-1l, Fn-1), and Lin  denotes  the linear  interpolation 
Lin qe,-l  (Fn-I  (4),  k+, s')  = kqe,n-I  (gj; k+, s') + (1 -  k)qe,n-I  (gj+l  ,  kI,  s'), 
if Fnr-(4)  = kgj + (1 -  k)gj+1.  At each step we modify G if necessary so that 
SF(V  )  E G for all s and all  , E  Gm  x K x S. Although it seems difficult to 
prove formally that the properties of  uniqueness and continuity of  the 
two-period equilibria are satisfied, and that xy  is a contraction, in practice 
the algorithm converges in fewer than 1,000 iterations. John Geanakoplos,  Michael Magill, and Martine  Quinzii  307 
APPENDIX  C 
Table Cl.  Prices in Markov Equilibrium  with Low Cohort Ratioa 
Pyramid A1:  MY ratio = 0.87  Pyramid A2:  MY ratio = 1.14 
Stateb  qe  PD/2  ran  rpan  qe  PD/2  ran  rpan 
Coefficient of relative risk aversion ox  = 2 
sI  97  11.4  1.96  0.27  117  14  0.6  0.28 
(0.9)  (0.1)  (0.01)  (1.3)  (1.9)  (0.23)  (0.01)  (1.2) 
S2  95  16.7  2.07  0.25  113  20  0.8  0.26 
(0.8)  (0.3)  (0.01)  (1.3)  (1.6)  (0.6)  (0.01)  (1.12) 
S3  51  6.5  5.3  0.23  61  7.3  3.96  0.27 
(0.6)  (0.13)  (0.01)  (1.3)  (1)  (0.3)  (0.01)  (1.2) 
S4  50  8.7  5.5  0.26  58  10.1  4.2  0.26 
(0.9)  (0.08)  (0.01)  (1.3)  (0.9)  (0.15)  (0.01)  (1.2) 
Average  73  10.5  3.7  0.26  86  12.3  2.5  0.27 
(23)  (2.3)  (1.8)  (1.3)  (28)  (3.3)  (1.8)  (1.2) 
Ratio  of average  equity  price  in pyramid  A, to that  in pyramid  A2 =  1.2 
Peak-trough  ratio  = 2.3 
Coefficient of relative risk aversion ox  = 4 
Si  145  17.5  -0.16  1.04  207  25  -2.5  0.99 
(2.5)  (0.3)  (0.01)  (2.3)  (10)  (1.3)  (0.07)  (2.0) 
S2  134  23.4  0.34  1.06  183  32.2  -1.9  0.87 
(2)  (0.7)  (0.01)  (2.4)  (8.4)  (1.5)  (0.06)  (1.95) 
S3  46  5.5  5.8  0.96  60  7.2  3.6  1.09 
(0.7)  (0.09)  (0.01)  (2.5)  (3)  (0.7)  (0.07)  (2.0) 
S4  40  7.1  6.8  1.13  49  8.6  4.8  0.99 
(0.5)  (0.2)  (0.01)  (2.6)  (2)  (0.4)  (0.06)  (2.0) 
Average  92  12.7  3.3  1.07  127  17.4  1.0  0.98 
(51)  (6.2)  (3.3)  (2.45)  (77)  (9.0)  (3.5)  (2.0) 
Ratio  of average  equity  price  in pyramid  A, to that  in pyramid  A2 =  1.4 
Peak-trough  ratio  = 5.1 
Coefficient of relative risk aversion ox  = 6 
Si  236  28.4  -2.6  2.16  301  47  -5.7  1.87 
(8.3)  (1.0)  (0.04)  (3.5)  (40)  (5)  (0.2)  (2.7) 
s2  202  35.5  -1.8  1.9  319  56  -4.8  1.93 
(6.3)  (1.1)  (0.03)  (3.6)  (30)  (11)  (0.2)  (2.8) 
S3  48  5.8  5.6  2.14  64  7.7  2.97  2.0 
(1.3)  (0.15)  (0.03)  (3.9)  (5.7)  (0.7)  (0.2)  (2.87) 
S4  37  6.5  7.4  2.3  43  7.5  5.2  2.7 
(0.8)  (0.1)  (0.03)  (4.2)  (3.3)  (0.8)  (0.2)  (3.0) 
Average  134  18  2.3  2.2  211  28  -0.4  2.0 
(96)  (12)  (4.8)  (3.8)  (169)  (21)  (5.2)  (2.9) 
Ratio  of average  equity  price  in pyramid  A, to that  in pyramid  A2 =  1.6 
Peak-trough  ratio  = 10.6 
Source: Authors' calculations  of equilibrium  values of the calibrated  model. 
a.  Cohort  sizes (N, n) are (79, 69), initial endowments  of the young adult  and  middle-aged  generations  in states  s, through  s4  are 
wy  = (2.3, 2.3, 1.7, 1.7) and  WIn  = (3.6, 3.6, 2.4, 2.4), and dividends  D = (83, 57, 83, 57). Standard  deviations  are in parentheses. 
b.  See table 4 in the text. 